Background

The historical connection between China and Mauritius can be traced to the period preceding Mauritius’s independence. Since the nineteenth century, migrants from southern China have been arriving in Mauritius—initially as labourers on sugar plantations, and later as free merchants. The Sino-Mauritian community—Mauritians of Chinese descent, predominantly Hakka—has played an important role in the Mauritian economy as merchants. They also maintained close transnational ties with relatives in Guangdong, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and various Southeast Asian countries.

As early as 1949, pro–People’s Republic of China (PRC) Chinese groups in Port Louis’ Chinatown raised the flag of the newly founded state, but the Sino-Mauritian community remained politically divided. When Mauritius declared independence on 12 March 1968, a ‘Peking faction’ advocated strongly for establishing official ties with Beijing, while a significant number of Sino-Mauritians and at least one Sino-Mauritian government minister aligned with Taipei.

Following years of debate, Mauritius ultimately decided to recognise the PRC. Formal diplomatic relations were established on 15 April 1972, during prime minister Seewoosagur Ramgoolam’s visit to Beijing, when he met with Chinese premier Zhou Enlai. During this visit, the two sides discussed five technical assistance projects, as Mauritius sought alternative financial support beyond the World Bank and the Soviet Union. As documented by Thomas Burnham, this led to the signing of the Sino-Mauritian Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation, under which Beijing provided an interest-free loan of 13.5 million GPB. The funds were designated for joint projects including a new airport, several hospitals, and social housing—representing at the time the largest aid package Mauritius had received from a single country.

After the Mauritius Militant Movement (MMM) took power from the Labour Party (PTr) in the 1976 elections, the Sino-Mauritian relationship remained stable and cooperative. Subsequent Mauritian governments, including that of the Militant Socialist Movement (MSM) led by Anerood Jugnauth, continued to maintain strong bilateral ties with Beijing. With economic reforms and liberalisation in both China and Mauritius, the framework of their cooperation shifted from the early language of ‘Zhou’s Eight Principles’ and ‘internationalism’ to ‘mutual benefits’. Bilateral engagement thus expanded significantly in scale and diversity, as reflected in the growing amount of trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and Chinese migrant workers and enterprises in Mauritius.

This intensifying engagement also fostered closer intergovernmental relations. Beginning in 1984, the Chinese Government offered scholarships to Mauritian students, enhancing educational exchanges. The establishment of the Mauritius–China Committee of Economic Cooperation (MCCI) in 1985 marked a milestone, leading to broader collaboration on infrastructure, agriculture, health, and education. A series of bilateral agreements was signed after the MCCI’s establishment, including the Mauritius–China Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement in 1994, the Mauritius–China Bilateral Investment Treaty in 1996, and the Bilateral Labour Cooperation Agreement in 2005.

Since the 2000s, China–Mauritius relations have deepened—demonstrated through a significant increase in government-to-government projects and Chinese FDI. Between 2004 and 2007, at least eight bilateral agreements were signed, under which China agreed to provide loans to Mauritius for the construction of projects ranging from government buildings to infrastructure. In 2007, the two countries reached an agreement to jointly develop a special economic zone (SEZ) in Terre Riche. Although the construction of the project has been slower than expected, it has been reimagined as a smart city under the Smart Mauritius Scheme, with several key buildings completed or under way.

Beyond development cooperation projects, ties between China and Mauritius have extended across multiple industries. Chinese state-owned and private enterprises have expanded into Mauritius in sectors such as construction, textiles, telecommunications, financial services, renewable energy, and real estate. In this context, many Sino-Mauritians have found new economic opportunities by facilitating the entry of Chinese companies into the local market, providing expertise on local regulations and business practices.

BRI Status

Although Mauritius has maintained close relations with China, it is one of only two African countries that have not formally joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The other country is Eswatini, which, in contrast to Mauritius, maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

This decision reflects Mauritius’s strategic concerns over diplomatic balance and stability within the geopolitical context of the Indian Ocean region. Mauritius has deep economic, political, and diasporic ties with India. Approximately 70 per cent of Mauritius’s population is of Indian origin, and the two countries maintain strong cooperation on defence and security issues. Mauritius has also received substantial development assistance from India over the years. Given India’s proactive opposition to the BRI in various international forums, Mauritius has faced significant pressure to avoid formal participation in the BRI framework. Officially joining the BRI could be interpreted as aligning with China, potentially affecting Mauritius’s relationship with India and altering the geopolitical balance in the region. Despite not joining the BRI, the establishment of the China–Mauritius Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2019 allows Mauritius to be incorporated into China’s broader BRI vision, at least in the realms of trade and investment.

Domestic politics also shaped Mauritius’s cautious position on the BRI. As a democracy, public opinion plays an important role in shaping foreign policy decisions in Mauritius. In local media, concerns have been raised about China’s international engagements, with China often framed as a ‘port-hungry predator’ and its BRI as a potential ‘debt trap’. Such scepticism has further diminished the likelihood of Mauritius formally joining the BRI.

Current Economic Relations

Trade: In 2019, China and Mauritius signed an FTA—the first between China and an African country—which officially came into force in January 2021. The agreement enables both countries to benefit from preferential trade terms and greater access to each other’s markets, covering goods, services, and investment. In 2024, China and Mauritius signed a bilateral currency swap agreement worth 2 billion RMB (approximately 13 billion MUR). This arrangement aims to strengthen bilateral financial ties, promoting the use of national currencies, and advancing trade and investment relations between the two countries.

China has become Mauritius’s largest source of imports. According to the UN Comtrade Database, in 2024, imports from China reached 1.17 billion USD, which represented 18 per cent of Mauritius’s total imports, exceeding imports from India—the second-largest source—by more than 50 per cent. In contrast, Mauritius’s exports to China are relatively low. Mauritius exported goods worth approximately 17.8 million USD to China in 2024—less than its exports to Europe, South Africa, and Madagascar. China mainly exports manufactured goods to Mauritius, including electronics, machinery, and steel products. Mauritius’s exports to China primarily comprise seafood, sugar, and telecommunication equipment.

Investment: In 2023, FDI in Mauritius reached a historical peak of 37 billion MUR, with Europe and South Africa traditionally the main sources of FDI. Four sectors—agro-industry, hospitality, real estate, and information and communication technology—together accounted for 84 per cent of total FDI. By contrast, FDI from China in 2023 amounted to 247 million MUR—significantly less than contributions from these traditional investors. The total stock of Chinese FDI in Mauritius reached approximately 1.52 billion USD by the end of 2022. Chinese investment in Mauritius has been concentrated in key sectors such as finance, real estate, manufacturing, and tourism.

The China–Mauritius FTA is expected to attract further Chinese investment. It offers stronger regulation and protection for Chinese investors, building on and upgrading the bilateral investment protection agreement originally signed between China and Mauritius in 1996. The revised framework introduces substantial improvements in terms of the scope of protection, the level of safeguards, and dispute-resolution mechanisms. It also facilitates the establishment of regional headquarters for Chinese companies in Mauritius, positioning the island nation as a strategic gateway to the African continent. Mauritius’s status as an international financial hub further enhances its attractiveness for Chinese enterprises seeking to expand in Africa.

Aid: Since the establishment of their diplomatic relations, China has provided Mauritius with development assistance including grants and concessional and interest-free loans, supporting major infrastructure projects such as the Jinfei Smart City (an SEZ), a new terminal at the Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam International Airport, the Côte d’Or Multi-Sports Complex, the Bagatelle Dam Project, the Mauritius Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) headquarters, and social housing projects.

In addition to financing key projects, China has donated equipment and material assistance. A notable example is the donation of 30 buses to the National Transport Corporation in 2017. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the Chinese Government, provincial authorities, and various enterprises provided Mauritius with medical supplies, including vaccines, test kits, masks, and personal protective equipment. China has also provided scholarships for Mauritian students to pursue higher education in China, as well as various professional training programs covering language, agriculture, governance, and technical skills.

It is important to note that other countries have also been significant providers of development assistance to Mauritius. India is the largest source of foreign aid to Mauritius, with its assistance focused on infrastructure development, security and defence, education, public welfare, and maritime affairs. Notably, Mauritius’s Metro Express was constructed with the support of Indian official development assistance, reflecting India’s broader efforts to enhance its influence in the island. France, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait have also provided concessional loans to Mauritius to support infrastructure, education, health care, environmental protection, and broader economic development.

Key Controversies

A key controversy surrounding China’s engagement in Mauritius is its impact on local democracy. From the outset, China and Mauritius adopted divergent approaches to cooperation. Chinese bilateral agreements with African countries, including Mauritius, have traditionally been flexible, vague, and opaque, often lacking clear mechanisms for the implementation of aid packages. In contrast, the Mauritian Government has expressed discomfort with this opacity, which has made it difficult to secure parliamentary support and navigate a divided political landscape. Notably, domestic divisions—between the left and the right, and between pro-Beijing factions and supporters of Taipei—have made the issue particularly contentious within both government and society. For instance, Mauritian scholar and activist Roukaya Kasenally has expressed concerns over confidentiality clauses and the lack of transparency in government-to-government agreements with China, many of which are neither publicly debated in parliament nor disclosed to the media. This opacity has fuelled public anxiety about potential corruption and raised broader concerns about Mauritian democracy.

At the same time, China is widely perceived to be advancing a soft-power agenda by promoting major Chinese projects in leading local newspapers. In response, media coverage of China in Mauritius has often raised questions about balance, editorial independence, and space for critical reporting. The Chinese-backed Safe City project—an urban surveillance system purportedly aimed at reducing crime—has intensified public concerns about China’s influence on Mauritian politics and digital security. Critics argue that the surveillance infrastructure introduced through the project significantly expands the government’s capacity to monitor citizens. There is growing fear that Chinese projects such as the Safe City could serve as vehicles for exporting elements of China’s authoritarian governance model to Mauritius. Even when framed as crime-prevention tools, such surveillance technologies are widely viewed as having the potential to erode privacy and undermine democratic freedom. Furthermore, the absence of clear policies on data collection, usage, and storage has deepened anxieties about digital security in Mauritius.

Another concern related to China’s engagement in Mauritius is the financial burden associated with large-scale Chinese-sponsored projects, particularly the Jinfei Smart City. For example, one researcher has criticised such developments for incurring substantial costs without generating proportionate economic or social benefits. To support the development of this SEZ, the Mauritian Government invested heavily in land acquisition, link roads, and off-site utility infrastructure. However, construction of the Jinfei project has progressed far more slowly than expected. The delays have raised questions about the motivations behind China’s involvement, with one researcher describing the project as a potential ‘land grab in new garb’, suggesting that the initiative may serve geopolitical rather than developmental goals.

Key Sources

Scholarly Publications

Ancharaz, Vinaye. 2009. ‘David v. Goliath: Mauritius Facing Up to China.’ The European Journal of Development Research 21: 622–43.

Burnham, Thomas. 2022. ‘Supping with a Long Spoon in the Indian Ocean: The Negotiation of the 1972 Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation between Mauritius and the People’s Republic of China.’ Cold War History 22(3): 245–63.

Cowaloosur, Honita. 2014. ‘Land Grab in New Garb: Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa.’ African Identities 12(1): 94–109.

Guan, Zhijie, Yue Zhang, and Ip Ping Sheong Jim Kwee Fat. 2021. ‘Trade Relations Between Mauritius and China: A Gravity Model Approach.’ SAGE Open 11(4). doi.org/10.1177/21582440211058184.

Kasenally, Roukaya. 2022. ‘China in Mauritius: The Telling of the Chinese Story.’ Asia Policy 29(3):70–78.

Shi, Xuefei. 2024. ‘Maritime China, Sea Temples, and Contested Heritage in the Indian Ocean.’ International Journal of Heritage Studies 30(6): 653–72.

Cover Photo: Tamarin, Mauritius. Source: Arne Müseler (CC).

Background

Madagascar’s relations with China span the colonial era and four post-independence Malagasy republics. Madagascar established formal diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in November 1972, as the African nation transitioned from the pro-France first republic to the pro-socialist second republic. However, informal and semi-official connections between Madagascar and China date back to the nineteenth century, when Chinese migrants from Guangdong Province settled on the island. Over the following century, the Sino-Malagasy community (ethnically known as sinoa) gradually expanded across the entire island, with more small-scale traders arriving, predominantly from Shunde County in Guangdong. This community has now reached its fourth or even fifth generation, and intermarriage with the local population is common. Some younger sinoa adhere to their Guangdong ancestry and carry Chinese passports, while others have become integrated into mainstream Malagasy society, among them two recent Malagasy ambassadors to China, Victor Sikonina and Jean Louis Robinson. Though no official census exists, a sinoa community leader the author interviewed in 2022 estimated that 10,000 to 20,000 Cantonese-speaking sinoa live in Madagascar today, with up to one million more having partial Chinese lineage according to their cultural practices or names.

In the 1940s, the Republic of China (ROC) set up a consulate-general in the port city of Toamasina (Tamatave), which was a hub for the Chinese community. The last consul defected to the newly formed PRC in 1949—an unusual event in China–Africa relations. The Taiwan-based ROC Government maintained an embassy in Madagascar until 1972—when Madagascar switched its diplomatic recognition—and a representative office until 2000. In this era, the PRC and the ROC vied to win over Malagasy regimes through competing investments and aid commitments. Many Madagascar-born Chinese have pursued education in either mainland China or Taiwan, which further fragmented the political loyalties within the community, although support for Taiwan has notably decreased since 2000. This is reflected in local associational life. Starting from the early twentieth century, the Chinese communities have built congregations (associations and halls) across the major towns in Madagascar. Local Chinese schools, initially built with ROC support, are now increasingly incorporated into the PRC’s Confucius Institutes and Classrooms program. According to the author’s field research, less than 100 Taiwanese now live in Madagascar, most working in the export–import and textile industries. Taiwanese aid has been mainly channelled through the Buddhist organisations Tzu Chi and Amitofo Care Center in the form of humanitarian relief and language education.

After Madagascar’s gradual shift towards Beijing under its pro-socialist regime, immigrants from the PRC began arriving in the early 1980s. This wave of migration was dominated by Fujianese (Hokkienese), whose trade and livelihoods closely mirrored those of their Cantonese and Taiwanese predecessors. In the 1990s, the Behoririka district of Madagascar’s capital, Antananarivo, saw the rise of its famous Chinatown, where Fujianese and Cantonese-owned shopping malls drew large crowds and caused congestion at the city’s bottleneck junction—a daily urban marvel that persists today. New migrants also showed greater interest in Madagascar’s untapped natural resources. Mineral, agricultural, forestry, fishery, and livestock resources became major exports to China. The mainland Chinese and Taiwanese textile industries benefited from Madagascar’s low-cost labour and preferential trade conditions under the US African Growth and Opportunity Act and the European Union’s Everything But Arms scheme. This period was also characterised by a proliferation of illicit activities involving members of the Chinese community and Malagasy elites, particularly the notorious smuggling of rosewood to China. According to the author’s interview with a former rosewood dealer, this trade persisted until the 2010s.

Madagascar has been an important ideological and strategic ally of the PRC. The Malagasy independence movement that resulted in independence from France in 1960 was partly inspired by the success of the Chinese Communist revolution. Gisèle Rabesahala, a leftist human rights activist who later became Madagascar’s first female minister and councilwoman, attended the Asian Women’s Conference in Beijing in December 1949. According to the memoir of Jin Boxiong, the PRC’s first ambassador to Madagascar, Didier Ratsiraka—a young leftist military attaché stationed in Paris in the early 1970s who would later serve as the country’s foreign minister as well as its third and fifth president—initiated contact with PRC counterparts to formalise relations. In the final period of Ratsiraka’s presidencies (1975–93, 1997–2002), in 1999, Madagascar’s then foreign minister Lila Ratsifandrihamanana proposed to her Chinese counterpart, Tang Jiaxuan, an exchange platform between China and African countries, which later became the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)—the primary mechanism for collaboration between China and the continent.

The formalisation of relations and the advent of mainland Chinese migration also brought large-scale aid projects in the 1980s and 1990s. Highlight events included a visit from Chinese president Li Xiannian in November 1986. It was followed by the opening of the Moramanga–Andranonampango road, a partial rehabilitation of the island’s primary artery National Route RN2, which connects Antananarivo to the country’s only deep-sea port, Toamasina. In these initial years of bilateral relations, the PRC’s aid projects largely focused on material support and disaster relief, with the intention to cement its relationship with the still-wavering Malagasy Government and the longstanding Sino-Malagasy community—in competition with the ROC’s remaining influence. Other large aid projects launched in this period include the Mahamasina Sport Palace in Antananarivo and the Morondava Sugar Plant (see the discussion of labour disputes below).

In the 2000s, under Marc Ravalomanana’s third republic, Chinese aid to Madagascar expanded in line with Ravalomanana’s pro-investment and foreign trade policies. Key projects targeted education, agriculture, and roadworks. However, the 2009 coup that led to Andry Rajoelina’s rise and years of international sactions abruptly ended this phase and disrupted ongoing Chinese projects. The political situation stabilised around 2015, and the establishment of the fourth Malagasy Republic eventually enabled most projects to regain momentum, including Chinese-backed infrastructure developments.

BRI Status

Madagascar seeks to balance its foreign policy among major powers. By engaging in Chinese-led international initiatives, it positions itself as China’s potential strategic partner on the Maritime Silk Road. Madagascar was among the first African countries to sign a memorandum of understanding with China to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2017. Seeking to diversify its sources of financing, Madagascar has also joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, currently as one of the nine sub-Saharan African members. In 2024, Madagascar, alongside Cambodia, became a founding partner of the International Mangrove Centre in Shenzhen, joining China’s efforts to promote a Green Belt and Road and global wetland governance.

Current Economic Relations

Trade: According to United Nations Comtrade data, China has been Madagascar’s largest trading partner in the past decade, followed by France, India, Oman, and South Africa. China is by far the largest source of imports for Madagascar. Chinese exports to Madagascar amounted to 1.39 billion USD in 2023, largely comprising electronic equipment, machinery, fabric, vehicles, plastics, steel, furniture, and cotton. Madagascar’s exports to China totalled 267.5 million USD in 2023, including predominantly ores such as graphite, micas, stones, and nickel, and aquatic resources such as crustaceans. Madagascar is seeking to expand its exports of agricultural goods to China. The inaugural shipment of mutton, sent in 2024, took advantage of China’s latest policy of zero tariffs on African products and the intermediary role of the island’s Chinese business community. It is important to note that the total trade volume between China and Madagascar in 2023, including both exports and imports, was lower than in previous years, due to the escalating economic crisis in Madagascar.

Investment: Madagascar’s local market and resources have attracted considerable Chinese investment. From 2017 to 2019, Chinese investors registered more new companies in Madagascar than those from France, India, and Mauritius, according to the Economic Development Board of Madagascar. Most Chinese investment has been focusing on agriculture (including fisheries), manufacturing, and construction. However, as latecomers, Chinese investors have been less successful in obtaining control over important resources, compared with other major international ventures such as the Ambatovy nickel–cobalt mine controlled by the Japanese Sumimoto Corporation and Korea Resources Corporation, the QMM ilmenite–zircon–rutile mine with investment from Brazil’s Rio Tinto, the Toliara Mineral Sands Project developed by the Australian mining company Base Resources, the Malagasy Oil S.A. controlled by a Singaporean–Indonesian national, and the Korean Daewoo Palm Oil Project.

Among the prominent Chinese investors in Madagascar are Yuan Longping High-Tech Agriculture, which promotes the cultivation of hybrid rice using Chinese agricultural aid and is diversifying its business into other agricultural products. SOMAQUA, a subsidiary of China’s national fisheries corporation, also operates in Madagascar. Tianli Agri is a major player in Madagascar’s cotton industry with equity investment from the China–Africa Development Fund, a Chinese state-backed fund supporting investment in Africa. King Deer Cashmere, which set up its first Madagascar factory in 1997, has been the island’s largest Chinese investor so far, benefiting from Madagascar’s low labour costs and preferential trade status, as well as loans from the China Development Bank.

Aid and Other Development Finance: In the context of re-emerging China–Africa cooperation, China’s aid to Madagascar started to increase in the early 2000s under the presidency of Marc Ravalomanana (in office 2002–09)—a period recognised for its pro-investment and foreign trade policies. Many impactful aid projects were initiated during this period, including the Confucius Institute at the University of Antananarivo, four China–Madagascar Friendship Schools, an agricultural-technology demonstration centre for hybrid rice, the rehabilitated Ampitabe–Vatomandry Road (known in Chinese sources as the Ang–Wa Road 昂瓦公路), a training program for Malagasy athletes in China, and the Ivato International Conference Center.

The 2009 coup affected some of the ongoing Chinese projects. The construction of the China–Madagascar Friendship School in Ambohidratrimo was delayed and resumed only after 2015. The Ivato International Conference Centre and associated Golden Peacock Hotel, both designed to accommodate the 2009 African Union Summit, were suspended due to the coup. Plans to commercialise the hotel were never fully realised, according to the author’s interview with a former hotel employee.

Major Chinese projects resumed in 2015, following the establishment of the fourth Malagasy Republic and subsequent political stabilisation. This period featured an increase of Chinese-funded road projects in Madagascar. China funded two Airport Expressway projects linking the Ivato International Airport to Antananarivo, including the Andohatapenaka-Boulevard de l’Europe Bypass completed in 2017—funded by a commercial loan and a preferential buyer’s credit from the Export–Import Bank of China (Eximbank)—and the Tsarasaotra–Ivato Road Rehabilitation Project completed in 2021, also funded by a concessional loan from the Eximbank. In 2017, China granted funds to rehabilitate the ‘Egg Road’ northwest of Antananarivo to help poultry farmers transport eggs safely (officially known as the Capital Suburban Road Project). In 2018, China offered a concessional loan for the development and expansion of RN2 between Toamasina and Tsarakofafa. This project includes the construction of the Tamatave–RN2 Expressway connecting RN2, Pangalane Bridge, and the Port of Toamasina, which is often referenced in Chinese sources as an exemplar of development cooperation following the 2018 FOCAC Summit. It is often referenced in external sources—including reports by the US Council of Foreign Relations, the Organisation for Research on China and Asia in India, and Africa Intelligence—as China’s attempt to take control of the port. Yet, these speculations are unfounded. In 2019, China provided Madagascar with a concessional loan to rehabilitate RN5A (Ambilobe–Vohémar Road), the only direct route linking Madagascar’s east and west coasts and a key passage for transporting its famous spices such as vanilla.

Since Andry Rajoelina—who first seized power in 2009 after toppling the third republic and led a transitional government until 2014—returned to the presidency in 2019, Madagascar has been turning towards European, World Bank, and Arab financing to rehabilitate its rapidly deteriorating road network, which has become a top national priority. This shift partly stems from mounting concerns about debt sustainability and a desire to diversify borrowing. Yet, despite relying less on direct Chinese funding, Madagascar’s infrastructure sector remains dominated by Chinese construction firms that originally entered through Chinese aid-financed projects. Major contractors such as the China Railway Construction Corporation, the China Communications Construction Company, the China Geo-Engineering Corporation, China Road & Bridge Corporation, and Sinohydro have retained a solid foothold and continue to bid on road-repair tenders. These companies may continue to benefit from their experience and established local presence to secure contracts, despite reduced financing from China’s state banks. They remain influential players in Madagascar, even if infrastructure financing increasingly comes from non-Chinese lenders.

In addition to road deterioration, Madagascar under Rajoelina’s rule faces increasing nationwide shortages of power, water, and food. According to the Global Hunger Index, the island country ranks at the bottom (124 of 127 countries) on the global malnutrition map—a situation exacerbated by climate change–induced drought and more frequent cyclones. External assistance, including that from China, has become ever more crucial to address these pressing issues. In 2019, the China–Food and Agriculture Organization–Madagascar South–South Cooperation Agricultural Project—a collaboration with the Mahitsy Chinese hybrid rice demonstration centre—was launched to support Madagascar’s agriculture, livestock, and fisheries. In 2024, construction began on the Ranomafana Hydroelectric Power Station, which is funded by a concessional loan from China’s Eximbank. It is reported to be the largest Chinese-funded project in Madagascar, with Sinohydro as the contractor. The same company also upgraded the European Investment Bank–funded Andekaleka Hydroelectric Power Station, which is Antananarivo’s main power supplier. During the 2024 FOCAC Summit, Rajoelina secured a Chinese grant for the ‘Medium Ring Tana’ project, which aimed to modernise the Antananarivo Interconnected Network for the first time in 60 years. The project is contracted to the Chinese group Tebian Electric Apparatus and funded by a grant from the Chinese International Development Cooperation Agency. China, alongside other international donors, provided emergency humanitarian aid through the UN World Food Programme to supply rice to climate-affected vulnerable communities in southern Madagascar.

Since 1975, China’s Gansu Province has dispatched medical teams to Madagascar. The teams are currently stationed at the Anosiala University Hospital Center, which was built with a Chinese Government grant. Subteams operate at Vatomandry, Ambovombe, and Sambava regional hospitals. The China–Madagascar Traditional Chinese Medicine Center was opened in 2019, by then vice-premier Sun Chunlan. Lately, new Chinese aid initiatives in Madagascar have emerged alongside the evolving bilateral economic priorities. For instance, the University of Antananarivo co-hosted a Luban workshop with two Tianjin vocational colleges for training in electrical and automotive engineering.

More recently, China has deepened science cooperation with Madagascar. In 2024–25, joint laboratories were launched between Chinese research institutes and Malagasy universities to study coastal ecosystems, biodiversity, and infectious diseases. A new species of Araceae from northern Madagascar was discovered by the Sino-Africa Joint Research Center at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (SAJOREC) and named for it (Carlephyton sajoreciae 中非中心灰岩芋).

Key Controversies

Madagascar’s unique ecology, wealth of natural resources, and fragile governance structures have made it a magnet for investors enticed by grand yet ill-conceived visions. Chinese investors, in particular, have drawn heightened scrutiny. Local discourses sometimes single them out as exploitative or driven solely by profit. China’s image often overshadows that of other foreign players involved in similarly problematic ventures. Below are some of the major controversies that have shaped perceptions of Chinese business activities in Madagascar.

Rosewood Smuggling

One of the most notorious cases involves large-scale smuggling of endangered rosewood—a lucrative trade that thrived in the 2000s and allegedly implicated government officials as well as Chinese business partners. This not only worsened deforestation in Madagascar’s biodiverse forests but also gave rise to a narrative of predatory Chinese engagement. Although global pressure eventually curbed the trade, rosewood smuggling reinforced the public perception that Chinese investors tend to disregard local laws and ecological responsibility.

Land and Sea-Grabbing

After the 2009 coup, the Wuhan Iron and Steel Corporation reportedly paid 100 million USD to Madagascar’s transitional government for iron ore exploration rights in the Soalala region, raising concerns about deals struck during political turbulence. Critics blamed Chinese companies for assisting the junta to circumvent international sanctions, exploiting the country’s vulnerable political situation to secure valuable concessions. Separately, in 2016, a Chinese-owned goldmining operation secured official permits but was met with resistance from local villagers in Soamahamanina. Protesters accused the company of disregarding environmental impacts and failing to share economic benefits with host communities. Eventually, the government revoked the company’s licence.

In 2018, Madagascar’s president Hery Rajaonarimampianina (in office 2014–18) invited Chinese investors to develop a new seaport in Narinda. More controversially, a Malagasy company controlled by the president’s son announced a plan to bring in an investor from Fujian with hundreds of fishing vessels—a move that, if realised, would allow them to dominate the country’s fishing sector. Amid domestic opposition, most investment agreements, including the seaport project, were terminated after the initial survey, as Rajaonarimampianina soon stepped down from office.

Labour Disputes

In December 2014, disputes over low pay and mistreatment of workers at the Morondava Sugar Plant, a Chinese aid project from the mid-1980s that had been run by the Chinese state-owned enterprise COMPLANT, became violent. The clash resulted in the deaths of at least four Malagasies, the withdrawal of Chinese staff, a 30-million-USD loss, and the plant’s full shutdown. Despite intervention from two successive Malagasy governments, plans to reopen the plant with other partners have not materialised.

Construction Quality

During his first term, Andry Rajoelina (in office 2019–25) allocated 4 per cent of the national annual budget to building the Mahamasina national stadium, seeking to make this project his political legacy. Construction was contracted to the China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC). After the stadium’s completion in 2021, the Confederation of African Football’s assessment found it technically unsafe and disqualified it from hosting games for Madagascar’s national football team. This development sparked online debate in Madagascar, with some blaming the Chinese contractor for the shortcomings, while others pointed to potential oversights by the Malagasy Government and local architects. Consequently, locals often refer to the stadium as a failed Chinese project, as it was constructed and maintained by CSCEC.

Collectively, these cases have reinforced the widespread perception in Madagascar that Chinese investors operate with little oversight or in collusion with the regime. More broadly, China’s engagement in the region is often viewed through the lens of Beijing’s strategic ambitions, associating investment projects with potential military or geopolitical objectives. When such projects falter, the resulting reputational damage tends to be magnified. However, it is also important to note that many of the controversial projects—whether in resources, ports, or fisheries—were driven as much by Malagasy elites’ pursuit of foreign capital as by Chinese initiative, often resulting in rushed and poorly negotiated deals. Some high-profile controversies were misattributed to China, such as the Korean Daewoo Logistics’ lease of 1.3 million hectares for palm oil and corn production, and the Ampasindava rare-earth mining project led by a Singaporean-Mauritian consortium. Both drew fierce public opposition amid confusion and suspicion about Chinese investment. The tendency to blame China thus often eclipses the complicity of local elites and other international players—a recurring pattern across the broader China–Africa context.

On the other hand, Chinese business communities, including small-scale sinoa businesses such as grocery stores and pizza and ice-cream makers scattered across the island, have been targeted by looters during political crises. In 2009, rioters looted several Chinese shopping malls in Behoririka, Antananarivo’s Chinatown. During the three-week Gen Z revolution that toppled Rajoelina’s rule in September and October 2025, the looting of a newly opened large trade centre owned by Zhejiang businessmen was even livestreamed on social media.

Key Sources

Fournet-Guérin, Catherine. 2009. ‘Les Chinois de Tananarive (Madagascar): une minorité citadine inscrite dans des réseaux multiples à toutes les échelles [The Chinese of Tananarive (Madagascar): An Urban Minority Involved in Multiple Networks At All Levels].’ Annales de géographie [Annals of Geography] 669(5): 543–65.

Giovalucchi, François, and Juvence Ramasy. 2022. La Chine à Madagascar. Entre opportunisme politique discret et trafics intenses [China in Madagascar. Between Discreet Political Opportuism and Intense Trafficking]. November. Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales.

Guccini, Federica, and Mingyuan Zhang. 2021. ‘“Being Chinese” in Mauritius and Madagascar: Comparing Chinese Diasporic Communities in the Western Indian Ocean.’ The Journal of Indian Ocean World Studies 4(2): 91–117.

Harnay, Serge, and Bernard Louis. 2011. ‘Madagascar: les enjeux d’une diplomatie en plein essor [Madagascar: The Challenges of a Booming Diplomacy].’ Outre-Terre [Overseas] 30(4): 261–69.

Pellerin, Mathieu. 2011. Le nouvel essor des relations entre la Chine et Madagascar [The New Boom in Relations between China and Madagascar]. March. Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales.

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Schiller, Cornelia. 2013. ‘China and Madagascar: Engagement, Perceptions, and Developmental Effects.’ PhD thesis. SOAS, University of London.

Veeck, Gregory, and Sokhna H.A. Diop. 2012. ‘Chinese Engagement with Africa: The Case of Madagascar.’ Eurasian Geography and Economics 53(3): 400–18.

Zhang, Ke, and Zeng Zhi. 2017. ‘The Trade of Malagasy Rosewood and Ebony in China.’ TRAFFIC Bulletin 29(1).

Zhang, Mingyuan. 2018. ‘“Being Chinese” in Madagascar.’ PhD thesis. University of Western Ontario, London.

Zhu, Annah Lake. 2022. Rosewood: Endangered Species Conservation and the Rise of Global China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Background

Bilateral relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Algeria can be traced back to the 1950s, when the PRC Government established close ties with Algeria’s national liberation movements. The 1955 Bandung Conference, also known as the Afro-Asian Conference, which was attended by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and delegations from Algeria’s National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale, FLN), was a milestone in this sense. China viewed itself as the natural vanguard of emancipation movements, and the Bandung Conference was a golden opportunity to promote its own experience with guerilla warfare and combating imperial powers. Zhou’s speech on that occasion explicitly stated that China would side with the Third World, fighting imperialism and colonial domination.

In this vein, China played a central role in supporting Algeria’s struggle for independence from French colonial rule. Not only was China an early supporter of the FLN, but also it was the first non-Arab state to recognise the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA), in December 1958, barely two months after its establishment. Between 1958 and 1962, China assistedImen Belhadj, Degang Sun, with the assistance of Yahia Zoubir. 2015. ‘China in North Africa: A Strategic Partnership.’ In North African Politics: Change and Continuity, edited by Yahia Zoubir and Gregory White. London and New York, NY: Routledge. the National Liberation Army (Armée de Libération Nationale, ALN)—the armed wing of the FLN—with funds, arms, and training for Algerian fighters. As early as 1958, a group of GPRA representatives was invited to China to meet Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials across the country. The following year, China hosted‘China Salutes Algeria.’ Peking Review, 7 April 1959, 3. an Algerian military delegation to ‘Algeria Week’. In 1960, two years before Algeria’s independence, Ferhat Abbas, the GPRA’s president, was received by Zhou Enlai to celebrate the PRC’s founding.

Algeria’s nationalism was rooted in socialist thought as an alternative paradigm to the oppressive nature of the capitalist colonial system. Yet, the relationship between Maoist China and the FLN was not simply based on abstract ideological affinities but was arguably a strategic alliance that worked in the interests of both parties. Overwhelmed with the consequences of the Great Leap Forward, the CCP used its support for Algeria to reaffirm its commitment to revolutionary ideology and expand its influence in North Africa. The FLN relied on the help of China to gain a monopoly on the representation of the Algerian nationalist movement.

After Algeria gained independence in 1962, political ties between the two countries intensified. Algeria played a key role in United Nations Resolution 2758Ann Kent. 2007. Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations, and Global Security. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. See page 48. , which allowed the PRC to take over the representation of China at the UN Security Council, replacing Taiwan, in 1971. The PRC won with 76 votes in favour, 35 against, and 17 abstentions. This win would not have been possible without the support of 26 African countries, including Algeria, which played a crucial role in rallying other African states. As acknowledged by Mao Zedong himselfQuoted in Anshan Li. 2013. ‘China and Africa: Policy and Challenges.’ China Security 3(3): 69–93.: ‘We were brought back into the United Nations by our African friends.’ In recent years, Algeria joined leading regional Chinese-led platforms, including the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF). Overall, China’s relations with Algeria followed a trajectory from ideological affinities and political interests in the first three decades after the PRC’s founding in 1949, to economic pragmatism starting from the 1980s, reflecting evolving domestic imperatives in both countries.

BRI Status

Algeria signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to join Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in September 2018 on the sidelines of the FOCAC in Beijing. In July 2019, the North African country ratified the MoU through a presidential decree signed by interim President Abdelkader Bensalah and published in the country’s Official Gazette. The decree stated that Algeria and China would cooperate in the fields of policy coordination and infrastructure interdependence, among other things.

Before joining the BRI, Algeria was the first country in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to enjoy a comprehensive strategic partnership and the highest level of bilateral relations with China. Visiting Algeria in November 2014, Yu Zhengsheng, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, China’s top political advisory body, stated that the goal of this partnership was to ‘enhance exchanges at all levels, cement mutual political trust and promote pragmatic cooperation’ between the two nations. In 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping concurred with this statement by pledging to promote further development of the partnership and continue the trend towards closer diplomatic ties. During the UN COP27 climate summit in Egypt in 2022, Algeria signed a second five-year strategic cooperation pact with China aimed at further strengthening bilateral cooperation.

Within the BRI framework, Algeria has inked a myriad partnerships with Chinese firms in various sectors, including infrastructure, industry, telecommunications, and energy. One of the hallmark projects of the BRI in Algeria is the Port of El Hamdania near the central city of Cherchell. The 3.3-billion-USD deepwater port is being built by a Chinese-Algerian consortium of firms, including the state-owned China Harbour Engineering Corporation, China State Construction Engineering Corporation, and Algeria’s Public Port Services Group. This infrastructure project is co-financed by the Algerian Government and the Export–Import Bank of China. However, progress has been slowLina Benabdellah. 2021. ‘Frozen in Time: China-Algeria Relations from Socialist Friendship to Pandemic Opportunism.’ In Routledge Handbook on China–Middle East Relations, edited by Jonathan Fulton. Abingdon: Routledge. since the first exploratory studies, back in 2012. More generally, despite much fanfare, the BRI has yet to lead to significant investments or job opportunities in the country.

Economic Relations

China has evolved from being a supporter of Algeria’s independence to one of its major economic partners. While diplomatic relations between China and Algeria can be traced to the early days of the establishment of the PRC, economic relations picked up only at the turn of the twenty-first century. In North Africa, Algeria holds the strongest commercial relations with China and is the leading construction market for Chinese firms.

Trade: Trade between Algeria and China increased significantly in the 2000s, making China Algeria’s top supplier, surpassing France in 2014. Mirroring key features of China’s trade patterns with the rest of the African continent, its exports to Algeria are dominated by finished manufactured goods such as electronics, automobiles, mobile phones, and clothing, while crude oil constitutes the bulk of Algeria’s exports to China. It is important to note that unlike trade relations with Gulf states, data on Sino-Algerian trade indicate a significant trade deficit for Algeria. For instance, in 2020, Algeria’s imports from China were worth about 5.6 billion USD, while its exports to China did not exceed 1 billion USD. This puts the trade deficit at 4.6 billion USD for 2020 alone. Overall, while Algerian consumers have benefited from the price competitiveness of Chinese products, Algeria’s manufacturing sector has suffered from the inflow of Chinese goods, which has accelerated the country’s de-industrialisation.

Investment: Following Beijing’s ‘Going Out’ strategy in the late 1990s, many Chinese enterprises, both public and private, ventured to invest abroad, and Algeria witnessed an upsurge in the presence of Chinese multinationals. According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce’s annual Statistical Bulletin on Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Chinese FDI stock in Algeria increased from 34.5 million USD in 2004 to 2.45 billion USD a decade later. A confluence of factors led to a decrease in Chinese FDI stock in the country, to 1.64 billion USD, in 2020. One such factor is linked to the political uncertainty in Algeria following the Hirak, the social uprising that began in February 2019 with a series of protests against President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s ambition to run for a fifth presidential term and later ballooned into a large-scale movement demanding meaningful political change.

Chinese investment in Algeria remains marginal, considering the volume of trade and contracts attributed to Chinese firms in the country. The distinction between service provision and FDI is important because these two types of transaction generate opposing financial flows. Algeria’s East–West Highway, the new airport in the capital, Algiers, and the Great Mosque of Algiers—all often described by the media as Chinese ‘investments’—are, in fact, juicy contracts awarded to Chinese construction firms by the Algerian Government. It is estimated that Algeria became the most significant market for Chinese construction firms, with the country granting an estimated 70 billion USD worth of contracts to Chinese firms between 2009 and 2019.

Since the 2014 drop in oil prices, Algeria’s infrastructural catch-up plans have slowed, with the country’s foreign reserves shrinking from almost 200 billion USD in 2014 to about 49 billion USD in late 2020. The fall in hydrocarbon prices led to a decrease in the value of Chinese contracts in the country, as shown in Figure 2.

As a middle-income hydrocarbon exporter, Algeria is not a major recipient of Chinese aid and loans, however, the country has been the beneficiary of Chinese assistance programs since its establishment. In 1963, just one year after Algeria’s independence, China sent its first medical assistance team to the North African country, boasting once again of its solidarity with the FLN. More recently, during the Covid-19 pandemic, China was quick to make various contributions to Algeria’s fight against the virus. It provided personal protective equipment and shared technical and medical expertise. Sinopharm even launched a partnership with Algeria’s state-owned Saidal to produce its Sinovac vaccine for the domestic market.

Key Controversies

Corruption: Major controversies have emerged in recent years regarding the practices of Chinese businesses in Algeria. Executives of Chinese companies seeking market access have been charged with paying illicit commissions, bribes, and kickbacks. The most notorious corruption scandals in the history of Algeria’s telecommunications sector involved Chinese-headquartered Huawei and ZTE. A court in Algeria held two ZTE and one Huawei employee responsible for paying bribes totalling 10 million USD between 2003 and 2006 to obtain contracts from state-owned Algérie Telecom. The two Chinese firms were banned from tendering for public telecommunications contracts for two years in Algeria.

Algeria’s East–West Highway, which spans 1,216 kilometres, connecting Morocco to Tunisia, was also marred by corruption scandals. A Chinese consortium between CITIC and China Railway Construction Corporation won a bid to build about half the highway for 6.2 billion USD. However, large kickbacks were paid in the construction process, resulting in a significant increase in the final price. It is worth mentioning that these scandals were not peculiar to Chinese firms but had more to do with president Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s (in office from 1999 to 2019) mode of governance, which was characterised by endemic corruption.

Regime Support: Chinese officials did not miss the opportunity to reiterate their support for the Algerian regime during the 2019 Hirak, or popular uprising, that aimed to topple it. Although after the protests began in February 2019, President Bouteflika was forced to resign, the army, Algeria’s true powerholder, prevented a genuine democratic transition by imposing a regime insider as head of state. Yet, when the European Parliament adopted a critical resolution entitled ‘The Situation of Freedoms in Algeria’, criticising the regime’s arrest and harassment of political opponents, human rights activists, and journalists, China’s Ambassador to Algeria, Lie Lianhe, was quick to back the Algerian regime’s response by declaring that China was opposed to any ‘interference’ by foreign powers in the country. Building on the historically friendly relations between the two countries has proven useful in consolidating bilateral ties that have served the interests of both in maintaining regime stability domestically.

Key Sources

Benabdallah, Lina. 2021. ‘Frozen in Time: China–Algeria Relations from Socialist Friendship to Pandemic Opportunism.’ In Routledge Handbook on China–Middle East Relations, edited by Jonathan Fulton. London: Routledge.

Calabrese, John. 2021. ‘“The New Algeria” and China.’ All About China Series, 26 January. Washington, DC: Middle East Institute. Link.

El Kadi, Tin Hinane. 2019. ‘The Promise and Peril of the Digital Silk Road.’ Expert Comment, 6 June. London: Chatham House. Link.

El Kadi, Tin Hinane. 2021. ‘China and North Africa: History, Economic Engagement and Soft Power.’ In Routledge Handbook on China–Middle East Relations, edited by Jonathan Fulton. London: Routledge.

Pairault, Thierry. 2017. ‘La Chine au Maghreb: de l’esprit de Bandung à l’esprit du capitalisme [China in the Maghreb: From the Spirit of Bandung to the Spirit of Capitalism].’ Revue de la régulation. Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs [Review of Regulation. Capitalism, Institutions, Powers] (21). Link.

Pairault, Thierry and Fatiha Talahite. 2014. Chine–Algérie: Une relation singulière en Afrique [China–Algeria: A Peculiar Relationship in Africa]. Paris: Riveneuve Éditions.

Zoubir, Yahia H. 2019. ‘Les relations de la Chine avec les pays du Maghreb: la place prépondérante de l’Algérie [China’s Relations with the Maghreb Countries: The Prominent Position of Algeria].’ Confluences Méditerranée 109(2): 91–103. Zoubir, Yahia H. and Youcef Hamitouche. 2019. ‘China’s Relations with Algeria: A Strategic Partnership?’ In The Politics of Algeria: Domestic Issues and International Relations, edited by Yahia H. Zoubir. London: Routledge.

Historical Background

Relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Angola have been shaped by the PRC’s involvement in Angolan anti-colonial movements and the protracted post-independence civil war, but cooperation between the two countries hit a high note during postwar reconstruction. During the period of armed struggle for independence from Portugal (1961–74) and in the early years of the Angolan civil war (1975–2002), China provided varying forms of support to competing groups vying for political control. These included the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Seeking to counter Soviet influence in the Third World and perhaps recognising affinities between UNITA’s guerrilla tactics and Mao’s rural-based revolution, China for a time favoured UNITA over the MPLA. However, by the late 1970s, the MPLA, claiming to represent the government of Angola, began talks with Chinese counterparts, and in 1983 the two countries officially established diplomatic relations.

Perhaps due to the inconsistency of bilateral relations during the civil war, it took China another two decades to powerfully reassert itself as an ally of the Angolan state. In 2002, the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi heralded the official end to the civil war. In need of financing for postwar reconstruction, the MPLA, under the leadership of President José Eduardo dos Santos, initially sought support from Western donors. However, by the end of the war, donors who had once been interested in promoting peace in Africa had shifted focus to conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Angola was also unable or unwilling to meet the conditionalities that would have accompanied funding from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The Angolan government therefore turned to China. In 2003, a framework agreement was signed between the Angolan Ministry of Finance and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, under which lines of credit worth 4.5 billion USD would be released from Chinese policy banks for funding the National Reconstruction Programme. Repayment of these loans was to be guaranteed through regular shipments of oil from Angola to China. In 2004, the Angolan government received an additional source of financing from China International Fund (CIF), a private company based in Hong Kong that is thought to have close connections to members of both the Chinese and Angolan governments. CIF provided several billion dollars in oil-backed loans for infrastructure construction and established a joint venture with the Angolan state-owned oil and gas company Sonangol to conduct exploration and trade in the petroleum sector.

The following decade saw a flurry of public infrastructure construction to fulfill both the immediate needs of postwar reconstruction and the development goals of the Angolan state. As oil production increased and oil prices rose, the country experienced double digit economic growth. Drawing a contrast against relations with Western countries, in 2006 President dos Santos described bilateral relations with China as ‘pragmatic’ and devoid of ‘political conditions’. This ‘pragmatic partnership’ between China and Angola facilitated the entry of both Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private entrepreneurs into the booming Angolan market. Chinese media had been reporting for several years on Angola as an important oil producer full of ‘golden opportunities’ for Chinese businesses. Moreover, as a condition of the Export–Import Bank of China, the majority of construction and civil engineering projects funded by the concessional loans would have to be awarded to Chinese firms on a list of approved SOEs, and at least half of equipment and supplies would be procured in China. By 2010, then Chinese ambassador to Angola Zhang Bolun reported that there were over 50 state-owned and 400 private Chinese companies ‘involved in Angola’s national reconstruction’. Pressure to quickly complete projects like the reconstruction of roads, water supply, and other basic infrastructure served as justification for employing thousands of Chinese technicians to do the work. Between 2006 and 2012, the number of Chinese citizens reported to be working in Angola grew from less than 5,000 to more than 250,000.

The prominence of ‘resources for infrastructure’ exchanges in the relations between China and Angola gave rise to the term the ‘Angola model’, a widely used, though disputed, concept which implies that Chinese loan agreements with oil-rich Angola have served as a template for engaging with African countries and the broader developing world. However, recent political and economic events have shifted the terms of the relationship. From mid-2014 to early 2016, the price of oil—which in 2012 accounted for 46% of Angola’s GDP and 96% of its exports—plummeted by 70%. Facing a crisis during which food was rationed and foreign currency became impossible to access, the Angolan government requested a freeze on repayment of its debt to China, which had by 2016 grown to an estimated 25 billion USD. At the same time, it began to reach out to other lenders, like the World Bank. In 2017, for the first time in 38 years, Angola elected a new president, João Lourenço, who launched a sweeping anti-corruption campaign targeting MPLA elites like the children of former president dos Santos, thus dismantling some of the personalistic structures that had supported China–Angola relations in the past. Angolan officials voiced interest in attracting investment and loans from countries other than China, which in 2017 held nearly 70% of Angola’s 32.7-billion-USD external debt. In 2018, Angola negotiated an unprecedented 3.7-billion-USD credit facility with the IMF; this reportedly included a commitment to stop taking oil-backed loans from China.

BRI Status

In September 2018, Angolan President João Lourenço attended the Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), at which a memorandum of understanding (MoU) related to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was signed between Angola and China. Returning to Beijing only one month later, Lourenço was the first African leader to make an invited state visit to China after the FOCAC meeting. Angolan and Chinese officials have described a ‘new phase’ of China–Angola relations, in which emphasis has shifted from postwar reconstruction to ‘economic development’. Chinese representatives express a desire for greater ‘efficiency’ in the implementation of Chinese-financed projects in Angola, with an aim to support ‘more sustainable’ development in the country. At the same time, the Angolan government has attempted to attract Chinese investment in priority sectors like agriculture, fisheries, tourism, and industry—part of a broader effort to diversify the economy and avoid overreliance on oil. An unprecedented privatisation programme is currently underway in Angola, with the aim of attracting foreign investment in formerly public entities.Chinese initiatives to support education and technical training in Angola have become more prominent in recent years. In 2018, the Chinese government agreed to donate 28 million USD to set up an Integrated Technology Training Centre (CINFOTEC) in Huambo Province, and construction began in February 2021. In August 2020, it was reported that Huawei had signed an MoU with the Angolan Ministry of Foreign Affairs to support training in information and communication technologies. The Chinese telecom company announced plans to build a technology park in Luanda worth 60 million USD by the end of 2021.

Current Economic Relations

Economic relations between Angola and China have historically been heavily influenced by bilateral agreements and lending arrangements from Chinese policy banks. These structures, which have facilitated financial, commodity, and labour flows, resist neat compartmentalisation into distinct categories of aid, trade, and investment. However, trade and investment activities that fall outside of the scope of oil-backed loans have been encouraged by both governments in recent years.

Trade: China’s initial lending agreements with Angola might best be understood as a type of financing designed to facilitate trade. Since 2007, Angola has consistently ranked as China’s largest trading partner on the African continent. However, this position is largely determined by Angolan oil exports to China. Angola has become the second largest source of oil imported to China, after Saudi Arabia, and in 2019, 68% of Angolan crude exports reportedly went to China. According to Chinese government sources, in 2019 Chinese exports to Angola amounted to around 2 billion USD, while Chinese imports from Angola were valued at over 23 billion USD. This positive trade balance for Angola belies a relationship in which petroleum dominates Angolan exports to China, while China exports value-added products to Angola—a discrepancy that can perhaps only be addressed through development of Angolan industrial capacity.

Investment: While loans from Chinese policy banks should not be considered investment per se, they have expedited the Angolan government’s public investment programme and facilitated investment by Chinese companies. SOEs that came to Angola to fulfill government contracts financed by Chinese credit lines have taken up additional projects in the country or expanded into other sectors. Many private Chinese companies, pushed to go abroad due to domestic market competition, set up businesses in Angola importing construction materials or other commodities related to postwar reconstruction. China is currently the leading source of proposals for foreign private investment in Angola. Reports from the Catholic University of Angola have specifically singled out Guangde International Group, owner of a shopping centre for furniture produced in Angola and factories for lead batteries, for investing over 230 million USD, contributing to job creation, national production, and exports from non-mineral sectors. They also cited Jiangzhou Agriculture for its significant agricultural investment in Huambo.

Aid: China’s foreign aid to Angola has taken the forms of construction of low-cost housing, construction of schools and hospitals, deployment of medical teams, humanitarian aid, training workshops, and debt relief. Some recent Chinese aid projects include an international relations institute and an agricultural demonstration center, both delivered in 2019, and a vocational training center which was established in February 2021. 

Other Finance: According to the calculation of SAIS-CARI, Angola has received more loans from China than any other African country, totalling 43.2 billion USD in 2019, including from China’s policy and commercial banks. While these loans are often confused with Chinese ‘aid’, many of them do not fall into the Chinese government’s official categories of aid nor the ‘official development assistance’ (ODA) defined by OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Some of the loans, such as those from the China Development Bank (CDB), are commercial in nature.

Key Controversies

Chinese–Angolan engagements in the context of postwar reconstruction were consistently criticised for allegedly benefiting the Chinese state, companies, and individuals, as well as Angolan elites—specifically President dos Santos and his close associates—at the expense of broader Angolan society. Many facets of Chinese construction have been cited as evidence of this. For instance, the Luanda General Hospital, built by a Chinese SOE with funding from a Chinese government grant, began showing serious structural deficiencies and had to be evacuated only four years after it was built. Premature deterioration of roads and other public infrastructure built with Chinese funding and construction companies may have been partly attributable to poor management and/or corruption on the part of Angolan institutions and individuals, but Chinese actors were nonetheless viewed as complicit partners if not cynical opportunists.

The massive influx of Chinese workers to Angola during national reconstruction triggered concerns about job creation for local labourers as well as some Chinese nationals’ movement from construction into other sectors, where they would compete with Angolan workers and entrepreneurs. Although no evidence to support this claim was ever produced, Chinese men living and working on construction sites were rumoured to be convict labourers. Also, voices in Angolan civil society expressed alarm at the sight of Chinese hawkers competing against impoverished Angolan women street vendors. In the initial years of postwar reconstruction, Chinese companies were found to engage in exploitative and sometimes illegal labour practices in their treatment of Angolan employees. However, over the past ten years, Chinese firms may have significantly improved their labour practices, employing more local workers and providing pay and benefits that could contribute to poverty alleviation.

The benefit of some Chinese projects to Angolan citizens has also been debated, with the colossal Kilamba Kiaxi housing project attracting particular attention in international media due to its scale and perceived unsuitability to the local context. Projects funded by China International Fund (CIF), such as the new Luanda International Airport, have been scrutinised for their opacity and for the alleged corruption of associated high-profile individuals. Large projects involving Chinese contractors and funding have also been criticised for expropriating land from local residents or for their ecological impacts.Debt sustainability remains a significant point of contention in bilateral relations. China has been involved in negotiations to restructure Angolan debt in the face of impacts from the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic and the accompanying fall in oil prices.

Key Sources

Local Media Outlets:

• Maka Angola has some content in English
• Jornal Expansão 
• 安哥拉华人报 

Scholarly Publications and In-depth Reports:

• Alves, Ana Cristina. 2013. ‘Chinese Economic Statecraft: A Comparative Study of China’s Oil-Backed Loans in Angola and Brazil.’ Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 42, no. 1: 99–130.
• Cain, Allan. 2017. “Alternatives to African Commodity-Backed Urbanization: the Case of China in Angola.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33, no. 3: 478-495. Link.
• Campos, Indira and Alex Vines. 2008. ‘Angola and China: A Pragmatic Partnership.’ Center for Strategic and International Studies website. Link. 
• Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica (CEIC), Universidade Católica de Angola. 2019. “Relatório Sobre as Relações China-Angola À Luz das 8 Iniciativas Propostas na Cimeira de Beijing do Fórum para a Cooperação China-África (FOCAC 2018)”, August. Link.
• Centro de Estudos e Investigação Científica (CEIC), Universidade Católica de Angola. 2020. “Segundo Relatório Sobre as Relações China-Angola À Luz das 8 Iniciativas Propostas na Cimeira de Beijing do Fórum para a Cooperação China-África (FOCAC 2018)”, January. Link.
• Corkin, Lucy. 2011. ‘Uneasy Allies: China’s Evolving Relations with Angola.’ Journal of Contemporary African Studies 29, no. 2: 169–80.
• Corkin, Lucy. 2013. Uncovering African Agency: Angola’s Management of China’s Credit Lines. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing.
• Jura, Jaroslaw, Kaja Kaluzynska, and Paulo de Carvalho. ‘“The Big Brother We Appreciate” or a “Mafios”’? The Emergence of Stereotypes Concerning China and the Chinese in Angola.’ Journal of African Media Studies 10, no. 3: 251–71.
• Marques de Morais, Rafael. 2011. ‘The New Imperialism: China in Angola.’ World Affairs 176, no. 6: 67–74.
• Oya, Carlos and Fernandes Wanda. 2019. ‘Employment Patterns and Conditions in Angola: A Comparative Analysis of the Infrastructure Construction Sector and Building Materials Industry.’ IDCEA Research Report, SOAS, University of London. Link. 
• Power, Marcus and Ana Cristina Alves (eds.). 2012. China and Angola: A Marriage of Convenience? Cape Town: Pambazuka Press.
• Soares de Oliveira, Ricardo. 2015. Magnificent and Beggar Land: Angola Since the Civil War. Oxford: Hurst Publishers.
• Schmitz, Cheryl M. 2014. ‘Significant Others: Security and Suspicion in Chinese-Angolan Encounters.’ Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 43, no. 1: 41–69.
• Schmitz, Cheryl M. 2018. ‘Performing ‘China in Africa’ for the West: Chinese Migrant Discourses in Angola.’ Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 27, no. 1: 9–27.
• Schmitz, Cheryl M. 2020. ‘Kufala! Translating Witchcraft in an Angolan-Chinese Labor Dispute.’ HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 10, no. 2: 427–86.
• Tang, Xiaoyang. 2010. ‘Bulldozer or Locomotive? The Impact of Chinese Enterprises on the Local Employment in Angola and the DRC.’ Journal of Asian and African Studies 45, no. 3: 350–68. 

Cover Photo: Angola. Credit (CC): Oscar Megia.

Historical Background

Djibouti is the capital of the Republic of Djibouti and a strategically located port city overlooking the southern entrance to the Red Sea. Despite considerable income from ports and foreign military bases, the majority of the country’s population—around one million people, most of whom live in the capital city—is extremely poor. The state gained its independence from France only in 1977 and established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China two years later. Until the late 2000s, there was little that was remarkable about Sino-Djiboutian ties. A low-key aid program saw China construct the state’s main sports stadium (which opened in 1993 and is named after the country’s first president, Hassan Gouled Aptidon) and provide limited economic assistance. Djibouti’s naval significance increased only in 2008, when China launched its first anti-piracy missions in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels increasingly used Djibouti’s port facilities alongside Western navies.

In 2012, China financed and began construction of a railway linking Ethiopia’s highland capital, Addis Ababa, to Djibouti’s main port. In July 2012, Djibouti’s President, Ismaïl Omar Guelleh (in office since 1999), attended the Fifth Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which led to the establishment of a bilateral Joint Ministerial Commission and the deepening of civil, naval, and military ties. Before Beijing’s formulation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, China Merchants Group (CMG) had already invested in Djibouti. In December 2012, CMG announced it had bought a 23.5% equity stake in Djibouti’s hitherto entirely state-owned Port Authority. CMG has since invested heavily in Djibouti—notably, the Doraleh Multi-Purpose Port (MPP) and several smaller regional ports. It also has a major stake in the Djibouti International Free Trade Zone (DIFTZ) alongside other Chinese investors. Djibouti is also a hub for undersea fibre-optic cables, including a Chinese-funded link to Gwadar in Pakistan.

In August 2017, the PLAN opened its first ‘overseas logistics base’ in Djibouti, which was effectively an armed annex of CMG’s MPP. China thus joined the United States, European Union, France, and Japan in having a permanent military presence in Djibouti. A few months later, in November 2017, Djibouti’s prominent position as an important diplomatic partner was reflected in China’s high-profile reception during a state visit to Beijing of the Djiboutian President—the first African head of state to be received by President Xi Jinping—following the Nineteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

Overall, Chinese investment has transformed the Red Sea state into a key logistics hub for a wide range of Chinese trade, investment, and naval activities in East Africa. Despite this, people-to-people ties remain limited; the small size of Djibouti’s rentier economy and hot, arid climate mean that links between large Chinese investors and ordinary Djiboutians are limited, and opportunities for small-scale trade are negligible. Chinese investment has brought little long-term job creation. An authoritarian, patronage-based political state, coupled with a tightly controlled media, means public criticism of China’s economic presence or environmental impact is hardly heard.

BRI Status

Djibouti signed a Memorandum of Understanding to cooperate with China on the BRI in September 2018, following a meeting between Presidents Guelleh and Xi in Beijing at the seventh FOCAC. In April 2019, the two countries further signed a ‘Cooperation Plan’ for co-constructing the BRI.

Current Economic Relations

Trade: Economic statistics for Djibouti are unreliable and trade data are doubly problematic. This is because the bulk of Djibouti’s international trade are goods in transit to neighbouring Ethiopia (for which Djibouti is the principal port) and Somaliland. The transhipment of containers, which arrive from China and are reshipped to smaller East African ports, further complicates trade data. Djibouti exports almost no local produce but partially covers its trade deficit from port fees. China accounted for around 45% of Djibouti’s imports in 2019. Alongside consumer goods, the bulk of these were imports for Chinese-financed infrastructure projects. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and India are Djibouti’s other main trading partners, with the Arab states importing Somali livestock that transits through Djibouti’s ports.

Investment: France, the former colonial power, now has negligible commercial assets in Djibouti and, since 2013, China has become by far the largest investor in the country, primarily in rail and port infrastructure. Arab investors, notably from the UAE, have also invested in Djiboutian infrastructure in the past two decades. The UAE’s largest project was the Dubai Ports World (DPW) Doraleh Container Terminal (DCT), which is not to be confused with CMG’s MPP, which lies just to the west of the DCT. This clarification is important as many analysts and journalists confuse the two ports, which have similar names and are both located on the same strip of coast called ‘Doraleh’. However, CMG’s investment in Djibouti caused three complex and closely interlinked legal disputes. The first was between the Djiboutian Government and Mr Boreh, the Djiboutian appointed to head the DCT. A former close confidant of the president, he was accused of corruption in favour of DPW. This merged into a second substantive dispute, between the Djiboutian Government and DPW, as the former sought to revoke the company’s control of the DCT and its exclusive rights to operate the country’s ports, which were granted in the mid-2000s. The London Court of International Arbitration ruled against the Djiboutian Government twice, in August 2018 and July 2021. The other legal dispute occurred when DPW sued CMG in a Hong Kong court for inducing the Djiboutian Government to breach its agreement with DPW. The case is still pending as of August 2021.

CMG is the leading investor in Djibouti today; it has a minority stake in the state’s Port Authority. When CMG took the 23.5% stake in late 2012, the authority was formally transformed into a private share company. This took the legal name Port de Djibouti S.A. (PDSA), with the Government of Djibouti holding the remaining shares, while the management company is known formally as Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority (DPFZA). In 2017, CMG opened its 190-hectare Doraleh MPP, just west of the capital, encompassing container, general, and bulk cargo facilities. Begun in mid-2013, the port was inaugurated in May 2017. The 1.2-kilometre quayside provides deep-water moorings that can accommodate up to six of the world’s largest cargo ships simultaneously. The MPP cost 590 million USD to build and was jointly financed by DPFZA and CMG. CMG, along with Dalian Port Group Corporation Limited—another Chinese state-owned port operator—and other investors, is also the key stakeholder in the DIFTZ, which is linked to the MPP.

In 2017, the president of CMG claimed the group’s aim was to transform Djibouti City and its ports into the ‘Shekou of East Africa’, replicating their ‘Port–Park–City’ model in CMG’s historical home port of Shenzhen. In December 2020, CMG signed a 350 million USD investment deal with the Djiboutian authorities to completely rebuild the old port of Djibouti as part of an ambitious real estate makeover of Djibouti’s historic capital. However, this is not the first futuristic plan for Djibouti’s redevelopment, and CMG’s vision of skyscrapers and a Dubai-style waterfront appears unrealistic.

China’s largest investment in the Horn of Africa is the 750-kilometre-long Addis Ababa–Djibouti railway. The project cost 3.5 billion USD and entered commercial service in 2018. Conceived and contracted before the launch of the BRI, this is a transnational project, with 650 kilometres of track in Ethiopia and the remaining 100 kilometres within Djibouti. The Djiboutian section of the project was covered by a separate, 505 million USD contract, awarded by the Djiboutian Government to the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC), a subsidiary of China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC), in February 2012. The contract was the subject of a dispute in 2015 over whether the Djiboutian Government or China was responsible for the cost of electrifying the line. This was resolved via the CCECC taking a notional equity stake in Djibouti’s portion of the rail operating company.

Contractually, the Doraleh MPP is separate from the surrounding DIFTZ. When (or if) completed, the DIFTZ will encompass 4,800 hectares and the total investment is estimated to be 3.5 billion USD, making it the largest free-trade zone on the continent. The DIFTZ, which was inaugurated in July 2018, is billed as being central to the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

Aid: China has supplied aid for a growing number of diverse projects in Djibouti since 2012. These include extensive educational and medical support. By 2020, China had sent 20 medical teams to Djibouti as part of its foreign aid program. China gifted new buildings to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a major infrastructure project signed in 2011. More recently, it constructed research centre facilities, including the building for the National Library and Archives, which was opened in 2020.

Other finance: In January 2013, China’s CGCOC Water Company Ltd was contracted to construct a 339-million-USD pipeline to supply water from Ethiopia to Djibouti. This has the capacity to supply 100,000 cubic metres of drinking water daily to Djibouti City from a source 70 kilometres inside Ethiopia. Djibouti reportedly borrowed 322 million USD in preferential export buyer’s credit from the Export–Import Bank of China (Eximbank) to cover the project.

Eximbank was also the key financier of the 100-kilometre Djiboutian section of the Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway, to the tune of 491 million USD, in the form of a commercial loan (85% of the total cost of 578 million USD, with the remaining 15% to be funded by CCECC). Also, in 2013, the Eximbank of China provided mixed loans of 405 million USD for port infrastructure (the rest of the total 580 million USD cost was to be funded by the Djiboutian Government). However, the actual disbursed debt remains somewhat unclear, although a significant debt rescheduling occurred in August 2019.

In 2013, CMG also announced a potential 70 million USD investment in a livestock port at Damerjog, close to the eastern frontier with Somaliland. However, construction of this appears to have been delayed. Damerjog, just to the southeast of Djibouti’s capital, is also the proposed site for a gas pipeline terminal. If constructed, this would handle gas from Chinese-managed fields in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, significantly increasing China’s involvement in Djibouti’s economy.

Key Controversies

Djibouti is a small, authoritarian, patronage-based state. Official media and political discourse are tightly controlled. Public controversy over the rapidity and scale of China’s engagement in Djibouti is therefore negligible, particularly given that Djiboutians have long been used to French, US, and Arab presences in the country.

Private criticisms tend to be limited to the fact that China’s investment has brought minimal stable job creation. However, there are growing concerns over the potential impact of further port developments in the Gulf of Tadjourah, which has a unique maritime ecosystem, with pristine coral reefs and breeding grounds for whale sharks. There have also been complaints about factory fishing by Chinese vessels off Djibouti’s coast. This is formally illegal, yet the small artisanal fishing communities in Arta, Tadjourah, and Obock recorded incursions by Chinese fleets in 2017.

References to Djibouti in the so-called debt diplomacy debates increased in 2018, when US officials trumpeted allegations that the country was falling into a ‘debt trap’. However, there is no evidence that China is intent on seizing control of the Doraleh Container Terminal, while comparisons with Sri Lanka, where CMG obtained equity stakes in the Hambantota Port at a time when the Sri Lankan Government was in urgent need of foreign exchange to repay its foreign debts, appear misplaced.

Djibouti has nevertheless seen a sharp rise in its debt burden occasioned by the scale of Chinese infrastructure lending, with loans for railway, port, and water infrastructure since 2011 topping one billion USD. Given the reality of the country’s very weak fiscal system and limited income, further rescheduling of debt appears likely. China negotiated an initial, substantive rescheduling of Djibouti’s debts in 2018–19. While Djibouti’s new terms were not published, they are believed to mirror those offered to Ethiopia, with repayment periods extended from 10 to 30 years and interest rates lowered from 3% to 2.1% above the London Interbank Offered Rate. Nevertheless, one expert estimates Djibouti’s annual debt service payments to be 104 million USD for 2021. While the debt is significant in relation to Djibouti’s tiny economy, in absolute terms, it is dwarfed by Beijing’s exposure to the debts of Ethiopia and other major African states, such as Angola and Kenya. As such, debt rescheduling for Djibouti is likely to follow the financial concessions made to Ethiopia and be informed by Djibouti’s symbolic and strategic value to Beijing.

Key Sources

Media outlets

• La Nation, weekly magazine in French
• Agence Djiboutienne d’Information

Academic publications

Barton, Benjamin. 2021. ‘Agency and Autonomy in the Maritime Silk Road Initiative: An Examination of Djibouti’s Doraleh Container Terminal Disputes.’ The Chinese Journal of International Politics (Online first).

Chiré, Amina Said (ed.). 2013. Djibouti Contemporain [Contemporary Djibouti]. Paris: Karthala.

Le Gouriellec, Sonia. 2020. Djibouti: la diplomatie de géant d’un petit Etat [Djibouti: The Giant Diplomacy of a Small State]. Lille: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.

Pairault, Thierry. 2018. ‘La China Merchants à Djibouti: de la route maritime à la route numérique de la soie [The China Merchants in Djibouti: From the Maritime Silk Road to the Digital Silk Road].’ Revue Espace Géographique et Société Marocaine, nos 24–25.

Styan, David. 2020. ‘China’s Maritime Silk Road and Small States (Djibouti).’ Journal of Contemporary China 29(122): 191–206.

Styan, David. 2020. ‘Djibouti: Geostrategic Balancing between the Horn and Red Sea.’ In Africa’s Thorny Horn: Searching for a New Balance in the Age of Pandemic, edited by Giovanni Carbone, 52–76. Milan: Ledizioni LediPublishing. Link.Updated on 25 August 2021.

Cover Photo: (CC) Coastal Djibouti (Archive: NASA, International Space Station.

Background

Overview

Lesotho, formerly known as Basutoland under the direct mandate of the British, became independent on 4 October 1966. In the early days of the country’s independence, the geopolitical competition between the People’s Republic of China (PRC, also referred to as ‘China’ in this profile) and Taiwan (Republic of China) to win allies was in full swing. Until 1966, the PRC had been more successful than Taiwan in gaining support in Africa, managing to establish diplomatic relations with 20 African countriesSee p. 34 . However, as China was primarily occupied with the Cultural Revolution at the time of Lesotho’s independence, Taiwan saw a chance to win an ally on the African continent and immediately began to step up its engagement with the newly independent country.

The first official state-to-state interactionSee pp. 113–16 between Lesotho and Taiwan took place at the southern African country’s independence ceremony on 4 October 1966 in Maseru, the capital. Taiwan’s Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs offered his congratulations and expressed his country’s willingness to cooperate with Lesotho. Only two months later, Lesotho’s Prime Minister Jonathan Leabua (in office from 1966 to 1986) visited Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. One year later, Leabua paid another visit to Taiwan, to study agricultural development projects. In 1967, the two governments signed their first basic agreement. A special technical cooperation scheme and a friendship treaty followed in 1968 and 1969.

Despite lacking official diplomatic ties with Lesotho, the PRC closely monitored events there as part of its efforts to understand and potentially support movements across southern Africa in opposition to South Africa’s Apartheid regime. At the time, Lesotho was politically divided into two factions: the Basotho National Party (BNP), Leabua’s party, and the opposition Basutoland Congress Party (BCP). The BNP was backed by South Africa’s Apartheid regime and often relied on South African military support to suppress the BCP. This made the BNP hugely unpopular among not only BCP supporters but also the general population. For this reason, Leabua occasionally criticised South Africa’s economic influence in Lesotho. This in turn was picked up by the Chinese press and quoted as an exampleSee p. 85 of a big country ‘bullying the small’, nourishing the Chinese public’s goodwill towards Lesotho.

In the spirit of opening to the non-socialist world, the PRC intensified its contacts with the BNP to deepen relations towards the end of the 1980s. The efforts culminated in an official visitSee p. 86 by Leabua to China in 1983 to study ‘socialist modernisation’ in Shanghai. Leabua must have been impressed with the progress China had made since announcing major economic reforms a few years earlier, because, like other countries at the time, he decided to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing that year, which entailed severing diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

After this, more state-to-state interactions took place. This was reflectedSee pp. 86–87 in the signing of an agreement on economic and technical cooperation in 1983, as well as in the emergency relief provided by the Chinese Government in the form of a 75,000 USD donation to buy food during a drought in 1984. Likewise, the number of official state visits between China and Lesotho increased. From the Chinese side, this included visits by the Minster of Metallurgical Industry Li Dongye in 1983, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Lu Xuejian in 1988, and the Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in July 1989. From Lesotho’s side, King Moshoeshoe II travelled to China in 1985 in the hope of gaining support against South Africa’s interference in the country’s affairs, while Queen Mamohato Bereng Seeiso took a trip to the PRC in 1987.

However, during the 1980s, China’s engagement in Lesotho remained rather symbolic See p. 87 and did not translate into any meaningful economic cooperation. In this area, private investors from Taiwan were more active and had a bigger impact on creating jobs and bringing foreign investment to Lesotho. This, in conjunction with Taiwan’s ‘cheque-book diplomacy’See p. 88 and a military coup against Leabua in 1986, explains why, in 1990, Lesotho’s military government severed diplomatic relations with the PRC. It took another four years, until the overthrow of the military government in 1994, for Lesotho to sever diplomatic relationsSee p. 89 with Taiwan for good.

In 1996, the PRC Government signed an agreement on the construction of Lesotho’s first national convention centre. Like many Chinese state projects, this was a ‘turnkey project’ (全套项目), and included not only the planning and construction of the facilities, but also the importing of materials and labour from China. In 1997, Lesotho’s new Prime Minister Bethuel Pakalitha Mosisili (in office 1998–2012 and 2015–17) took a very cooperative approach towards China and, under his tenure, state-level interactions increased. These included China’s dispatch of medical teams to Lesotho in 1997, the construction of the Botha Bothe Industrial Park in 2002, and the partial forgiving of Lesotho’s debt. Other projects included the Lesotho National Library, the ’Manthabiseng Convention Centre, the parliament building, and phase one of the Mafeteng Solar Power Plant Project, as well as several technical cooperation projects in agriculture.

Since the 2000s, steady progress has been made in bilateral cooperation. Exact figures and forms of finance are often not made public. Yet, according to the Chinese Embassy in Lesotho, several assistance and cooperation projects, including the first phase of the technical cooperation project for land use and physical planning, the radio and television network expansion project, and the solar energy demonstration project were completed by 2023. In 2024, further projects were announced. These included the Police Fingerprint Examination Laboratory, for which the equipment is already in place and installation and training will begin soon; the Maseru Fire Station and Fire Engine project, with construction and delivery set to proceed after the signing of the implementation agreement; and the Maseru Agriculture Storage and Logistics Infrastructure project, which was scheduled to begin construction in June 2024.

Exchanges and cooperation in other fields continued to deepen. In July 2013, an art troupe of university students from Shanghai staged performances in Lesotho. In October 2014, the two governments signed the ‘Implementation Programme for the Years 2014 to 2017 of the Agreement on the Cultural Cooperation between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho’. The same year, the ‘Licence Agreement between the State Administration of Press and Publication, Radio, Film and Television of the People’s Republic of China and Lesotho National Broadcasting Services’was signed. This included the provision of scholarships for study and technical training in China. According to the Chinese Embassy in Lesotho, as part of Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) activities, China organised training for approximately 300 Basotho in China in 2019, bringing to more than 3,000 the total number of Basotho trained in the PRC.

Zooming In: Lesotho’s Political Economy

While the above provides an overview of the geopolitical tensions that underpin Lesotho’s relations with the PRC, the southern African country is a good example of how economic ties and interactions between ordinary people are often more influential than official diplomatic relations. To fully understand these dynamics, it is essential to examine Lesotho’s complex postcolonial history and its political economy, in which China’s state-owned enterprises and other official actors have never played a big role.

At the time of its independence, Lesotho was (and continues to be) a small, landlocked country with no significant natural resources, except for water. While economic development is not necessarily tied to natural resources, for a country like Lesotho, it was nevertheless a strong impediment. Historically, agriculture was essential for providing employment opportunities and enabling economic growth (World Bank 1965: 5). By the early 1970s, however, it became clear that soil erosion and population growth would have a detrimental impact on the agricultural sector (World Bank 1965: 5; Rosenberg 2007: 461). Therefore, developing the private sector became essential.

Boosting Private Sector Development

After independence, Lesotho’s private sector was small, comprising mostly public sector entities, print shops, and mission operations, with a combined turnover See p. 68 of less than 1 million ZAR and only 500 employees. South African companies controlled See p. 38 foreign trade as well as the insurance and wholesale and retail sectors, leaving minimal space for local Basotho enterprises. With a weak industrial base and limited employment opportunities in the private sector, most Basotho, particularly men, sought work in South African mines and farms, with 35,000 Basotho men See p. 18 employed in South Africa between 1967 and 1973, compared with just 2,000 jobs created domestically during the same period. Those who stayed in Lesotho were engaged in subsistence agriculture or the public sector.

Lesotho experienced a brief period of economic growth See p. 8 in the mid-1970s as migrant workers’ remittances poured in, while customs revenues, diamond production, and inflows of external assistance from Western donors concomitantly increased. During this brief period, Basotho entrepreneurs established small businesses, aiming to build an alternative future that did not rely on working in South African mines. However, Lesotho’s economic growth stagnated See p. 2 by the 1980s. According to the World Bank, See p. 35 its private sector ‘provided only a limited number of jobs, employing only 13 percent of the domestic workforce’. Lacking the capital to change this situation, Lesotho recognised the need to target foreign investors, much like the approach taken by China and Taiwan at the time. The government first set up several institutions aimed at attracting investment and developing an indigenous industry sector. These institutions  included See p. 228 the Lesotho National Development Corporation, the Basotho Traders Association, the Basotho Enterprise Development Corporation, and the Lesotho Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

These institutions were instrumental in promoting economic cooperation with Taiwan and later China, while also supporting the growth of the private sector and the creation of employment opportunities for Basotho. For instance, the Highlands Water Project became Lesotho’s ‘brightest investment opportunity’. See p. vi Through the construction of large water reservoirs and dams in its remote highlands, Lesotho became the primary supplier of water and a key energy provider to South Africa. The revenues generated from these projects continue to be a crucial source of incomeSee p. 81  for the government to this day, but also created temporary employment opportunities for Basotho.

By far the most impactful initiative for creating employment and boosting the private sector was the establishment of Taiwanese-owned textile and garment factories. Taiwanese investors had been exploring business opportunities in Lesotho since 1974, when Taiwan and Lesotho signed mutual visa waiver agreements,See p. 92 encouraging Taiwanese investors to travel to the region. Taiwanese investors were already actively investing in the textile and garment sectors across the border in South Africa’s homelands, or Bantustans. These were 10 rural regions designated by the Apartheid regime as separate ‘nations’ for various ethnic groups among Black South Africans. The governments of the homelands offered favourable conditions to Taiwanese factories hoping to boost economic development and employment creation. However, this opportunity was short-lived, as increasing international sanctions against the Apartheid regime pressured Taiwanese investors to relocate their production. Nearby Lesotho presented a more viable option See p. 1004 for continuing operations while circumventing these sanctions.

The textile industry received a further temporary boost when Lesotho signed the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (US) in 2001, allowing the country to expand its textile and apparel exports to the United States. However, overall economic diversification has been challenging due to structural constraints. The public sector dominates the economy and offers limited employment opportunities, primarily catering to highly skilled and educated Basotho. The manufacturing sector in Lesotho is concentrated in two areas: mining and textile/apparel manufacturing. These two sectors account for 84 per cent of formal sector employment and more than two-thirds of total exports.

Textile and apparel exports have been declining due to competitiveness issues and labour market challenges, with Kenya overtaking Lesotho as the top apparel exporter to the United States under the AGOA. Employment in the export manufacturing sector dropped from ‘a peak of 43,500 in February 2020 to 31,000 in April 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. While it rebounded to 39,000 by September 2020, it later fell to 37,000 by June 2022.’ Job losses in this sector have hit women particularly hard, as they make up 80 per cent of the workforce but are more likely to hold lower-skilled positions compared with men. Additionally, prospects for growth and job creation in the mining sector, which focuses mainly on diamond exports, remain limited.

Anti-Foreign Riots and Tensions

Although the factories created employment opportunities on an unprecedented scale in Lesotho, they also set the stage for ongoing tensions between Basotho and Taiwanese and Chinese migrants for two reasons. First, the new factories had a reputation for exploiting workers See p. 230 (Tangri 1993: 230). Second, in addition to large-scale investors, small-scale businesspeople from Taiwan and later from China began to seize opportunities outside the textile and garment industries. This created the impression of a growing, unwanted presence of Chinese migrants.

The first national outcry about the presence of the Taiwanese—who were generally referred to as ‘the Chinese’ See p. 221—occurred as early as 1987. In 1991, the situation escalatedSee p. 221 when a Mosotho was killed by the security guard of a Taiwanese-owned shop. Angry Basotho attacked Taiwanese shops, and many Taiwanese fled to South Africa. Many did not return to Lesotho but the number of migrants from mainland China grew.

Small numbers of migrants from Shanghai  came to Lesotho See p. 9 as early as the mid-1980s. These pioneers often worked in the Taiwanese-owned factories and decided to stay in Lesotho to open small shops and businesses. However, at the time, migrants from mainland China constituted a small, less-visible minority as textile and garment factories were predominantly Taiwanese-owned. The first migrants from Fuqing, a county in China’s Fujian Province, which later would constitute the largest migrant group in Lesotho, arrived in 1992See Chen, Chunguang, 福清华侨史 [Overseas Chinese History of Fuqing], Communist Party Publishing House, 2010, p. 74. These pioneers played a key role See p. 90 in establishing and shaping the Fuqingese community in the country.

The 1990s in Lesotho were marked by political instability, largely due to rivalries between the main political parties, culminating in riots in 1998. The unrest was sparked by widespread dissatisfaction with the results of the 1998 parliamentary elections, which many viewed as fraudulent. In September 1998, protests turned violent, leading to clashes between demonstrators and security forces. The unrest exposed deep-seated political and economic grievances. The riots caused significant property damage, particularly to foreign businesses, disrupted daily life, and ultimately led to a substantial exodus of Taiwanese small business owners.

The businesses left by Taiwanese migrants were soon taken over by migrants from mainland China. Unlike Taiwanese migration, which was often a by-product of state-sponsored projects, migration from China largely resulted from private initiative. These new migrants came mostly from Fujian Province, in particular Fuqing county-level city. They set up small shops and businesses across Lesotho, creating the impression that ‘the Chinese are everywhere’. To this day, relations between the Basotho and Chinese migrants remain strained, with Basotho perceiving the latter as monopolising business opportunities and primarily offering low-paid jobs and inexpensive goods. Although there have been no major large-scale riots in Lesotho since 1998, Chinese migrants are often targeted in robberies and other crimes, and they tend to perceive the overall environment as unstable and unsafe.

BRI Status

As a small, landlocked country, Lesotho is not a prominent player in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which it joined officially only in 2019. That year, Prime Minister Tom Thabane (in office 2012–15 and 2017–20) visited China and supported the BRI for its potential to further Lesotho’s development. The Chinese Embassy in Maseru highlights recent projects as examples of BRI cooperation. These include the Mpiti–Sehlabathebe road, which will enable access to the Sehlabathebe National Park, a World Heritage site; the Maseru District Hospital and Eye Clinic to improve healthcare services; and new initiatives like the Mafeteng Solar Power Station and the Maseru Fire Station. These projects are in line with China’s BRI goals and aim to bolster infrastructure development, stimulate economic growth, and improve living conditions in Lesotho.

Current Economic Relations

Trade: China is not a major trading partner of Lesotho in terms of value, with South Africa and the United States dominating Lesotho’s external trade. In 2023, South Africa was Lesotho’s largest import source, accounting for 78.4 per cent of its imports, and a major export destination, making up 37.4 per cent of Lesotho’s exports. The United States followed as a key export destination, with a 28.1 per cent share. China accounted for only 6.1 per cent of Lesotho’s imports—a percentage that is smaller than Belgium and the United Arab Emirates.

The modest trade volume between China and Lesotho largely stems from the nature of Lesotho’s primary imports and exports, which do not align well with China’s industrial capacities or typical export offerings to Africa. Lesotho’s key imports—such as refined petroleum (12 per cent), light rubberised knitted fabric (5.4 per cent), raw cotton (4.5 per cent), electricity (2.8 per cent), and synthetic filament yarn woven fabric (2 per cent)—are not goods that China typically exports to African markets. Meanwhile, Lesotho’s main exports—including diamonds (35.2 per cent), knitted women’s suits (8.5 per cent), non-knitted men’s suits (8.4 per cent), water (5.3 per cent), and knitted T-shirts (5.3 per cent)—are either difficult to transport to China or are items that China already produces in large quantities, such as apparel. This mismatch results in a relatively limited trade relationship between the two countries.

In 2017, Lesotho’s total exports amounted to 900 million USD, but its exports to China were worth just 23.9 USD million. The main products exported to China in that year included wool (15.4 million USD), low-voltage protection equipment (3.5 million USD), and diamonds (1.9 million USD). The limited role of China in Lesotho’s trade is evident in the total export value of diamonds, along with knitted fabric and synthetic yarn, which amounted to 172,199 USD and 94,424 USD, respectively. Lesotho’s exports to China are declining, decreasing from 23.9 million USD in 2017 to 20.9 million USD in 2022. To illustrate this, we can examine the trade statistics from 2022. Lesotho’s total imports amounted to almost 1.9 billion USD, but China’s exports to the country reached barely 116 million USD (up from 61.3 million USD in 2017, with an average annual growth of 13.7 per cent). These exports primarily consisted of light rubberised knitted fabric (46.2 million USD), synthetic filament yarn woven fabric (13 million USD), and iron structures (4.21 million USD).

Investment: The share of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Lesotho’s gross domestic product has historically ranged between 1 per cent and 1.4 per cent. The investment was predominantly directed towards two sectors: export-oriented manufacturing, particularly in the garment industry, which is mostly controlled by Taiwanese and Chinese investors, and the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, a collaboration with South Africa that created temporary jobs in construction. More than 90 per cent of FDI in the country has been directed to ‘cut–make–trim’ operations that utilise imported fabrics, representing about 38 of the estimated 55 foreign affiliates in the country. However, this once-promising sector has experienced a sharp decline: while it was experiencing annual growth rates of 25 per cent in 2001, by 2024 the rate had dropped to 1.3 per cent.

Lesotho needs foreign investment to boost employment opportunities and economic growth. However, there has been growing criticism in Lesotho of foreign investors who repatriate their profits instead of reinvesting in the country. To counter this, Lesotho has introduced regulations to limit foreign participation in small business and certain sectors, reserving these opportunities for Basotho. Although these policies target foreign operators, they predominantly impact Chinese nationals who are active in these sectors.

For example, the Trading Enterprises Regulations of 2011 and the Business Licensing and Registration Regulations of 2020 restrict foreign ownership in specific businesses to a maximum of 49 per cent, affecting sectors such as barbershops, snack bars, and small retail enterprises. The Business Licensing and Registration Act 2019 requires foreign investors to show proof of 123,152 USD in capital or deposit the same amount locally, though this conflicts with the Central Bank of Lesotho’s minimum threshold of 250,000 USD, causing confusion. The Act also imposes annual renewal requirements for business identification cards on foreigners, while locals renew every three years—a process many find burdensome.

Aid/Development Projects: China is not a major source of development assistance for Lesotho. Due to historical ties, the Republic of Ireland and the United States are prominent donors to Lesotho. Additionally, South Africa and Lesotho have collaborated on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, a key initiative for water supply and hydropower that brings in about 15 million USD in annual royalties and creates substantial employment opportunities.

Key Controversies

Economic concerns: One major controversy surrounding Chinese investment in Lesotho is the perception that it often benefits Chinese nationals more than local communities. In the wholesale and retail sectors, many Basotho argue that Chinese businesses exclude them from economic opportunities. Moreover, critics contend that these businesses often repatriate profits instead of reinvesting them in the local economy. Additionally, Chinese nationals in these sectors are often victims of violent crime, further complicating the relationship between local communities and foreign businesses. In 2019, a Chinese shop-owner was killed in his store, highlighting the dangers faced by foreign nationals in Lesotho’s retail sector. Although many shops are equipped with security cameras and guards, these measures often prove ineffective in preventing violent crime.

A more recent development is the trade of wool with China. Historically, this trade was organised through a South African broker. However, in 2019, the government decided to open it to a Chinese broker. That same year, several thousand farmers in Lesotho marched to parliament to protest regulations requiring them to sell their wool and mohair to this Chinese broker.

Labour and Employment Issues: Chinese-run businesses in Lesotho have also faced scrutiny of their labour practices. Chinese-owned firms are perceived as offering lower wages and poorer working conditions. This has led to dissatisfaction among Basotho workers and created tensions between the local workforce and Chinese employers. Chinese and Taiwanese-operated factories frequently face protests from workers about pay and working conditions. In February 2021, a woman was shot and killed during violent clashes between factory workers and police. The demonstrations resulted in the looting of several businesses in Maseru. Lesotho’s 50,000 factory workers demanded a 20 per cent salary increase for the lowest-paid employees. Company management offered only a 5 per cent increase, citing the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Covid-19: The outbreak of the coronavirus led to scaremongering in Lesotho, prompting some textile workers at Tzicc Clothing to down tools in February 2020 after their Chinese colleagues returned to the factory wearing masks and were separated from them. The Basotho workers were concerned that the Chinese workers might have contracted the virus. Samuel Mokhele, Secretary-General of the National Clothing Textile and Allied Workers Union, stated that on learning of the return of Chinese workers to the factories, the union immediately approached the Ministry of Health for clarification and action.

Key Sources

Academic Sources

Akokpari, John K. 2011. ‘Strangers in a Strange Land: Citizenship and the Immigration Debate in Lesotho.’ Development Southern Africa 22(1): 87–102.

Ferguson, James. 1990. The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Hanisch, Sarah. 2013. ‘At the Margins of the Economy? Chinese Migrants in Lesotho’s Wholesale and Retail Sector.’ Africa Spectrum 48(3): 85–97.

Hanisch, Sarah. 2022. Searching for Sweetness: Women’s Mobile Lives in China and Lesotho. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Hart, Gillian. 2002. Disabling Globalization: Places of Power in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Kalley, Jacqueline A., Elna Schoeman, and L.E. Andor, eds. 1999. Southern African Political History: A Chronology of Key Political Events from Independence to Mid-1997. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing.

Lall, Sanjaya. 2007. ‘FDI, AGOA and Manufactured Exports by a Landlocked, Least Developed African Economy: Lesotho.’ Journal of Development Studies 41(6): 998–1022.

Park, Yoon Jung. 2010. ‘Boundaries, Borders and Borderland Constructions: Chinese in Contemporary South Africa and the Region.’ African Studies 69(3): 457–79.

Park, Yoon Jung, and Anna Ying Chen. 2009. ‘Recent Chinese Migrants in Small Towns of Post-Apartheid South Africa.’ Revue européenne des migrations internationales [European Review of International Migration] 25(1): 25–44.

Rosenberg, Scott. 2007. ‘South African and Global Apartheid: The Experience of Basotho Labor in the South African Gold Mines and Taiwanese-Owned Textile Factories.’ Safundi: The Journal of South African and American Studies 8(4): 459–72.

Seidman, Gay W. 2009. ‘Laboring Under an Illusion? Lesotho’s “Sweat-Free” Label.’ Third World Quarterly 30(3): 581–98.

Tangri, Roger. 1993. ‘Foreign Business and Political Unrest in Lesotho.’ African Affairs 92(367): 223–38.

Taylor, Ian. 1997. ‘The “Captive States” of Southern Africa and China: The PRC and Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.’ The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 35(2): 75–95.

Taylor, Ian. 2010. ‘Taiwan’s Foreign Policy and Africa: The Limitations of Dollar Diplomacy.’ Journal of Contemporary China 11(30): 125–40.

Featured Image: Lesotho, Source: @fiverlocker, Flickr.com (CC).

Background

Nigeria’s relationship with China began to flourish following the normalisation of diplomatic ties in 1971. Between 1970 and 1993, the two countries developed closer political relations, driven by aligned ideological objectives and a shared experience of international isolation. In the 1970s, China supported anti-imperialist movements across Africa, with Nigeria directingM. Kwanashie, ‘Sino-Nigerian Relations: Implications for Trade’, paper presented at the Roundtable on Sino-Nigerian Relation: Economic and Political Dimensions, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos, 26 August 2007.this assistance to national liberation groups.

In the 1990s, both countries faced international criticism—Nigeria for its authoritarian regimes, and China in the aftermath of the 1989 crackdown on the democratic movement—which further strengthened their partnership. Engagement deepened under Nigeria’s ‘Look East’ policy, adopted during the military rule of Sani Abacha (1993–98), which was a period marked by heavy international sanctions. In 1997, premier Li Peng of China’s State Council paid a high-level visit to Nigeria, which at the time was regarded as an international pariah following the execution of activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. The visit included the signing of several bilateral agreements, signalling a strategic pivot by the Abacha regime towards China as a key ally.

Presidents from both countries have since maintained high-level contact, with diplomatic cooperation expanding further after Nigeria’s return to constitutional democracy in 1999.

Since 1999, Nigeria has deepened its ties with China, forging a relationship that has expanded across successive administrations. During the presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007), Nigeria pursued an ‘oil-for-infrastructure’ policy and encouraged Chinese engagement in the energy and telecommunications sectors. This approach continued under presidents Umaru Musa Yar’Adua (2007–10) and Goodluck Jonathan (2010–15), who approved Chinese-backed projects in key infrastructure such as airports and railways, while also expanding development cooperation and bilateral trade.

Under president Muhammadu Buhari (2015–23), Nigeria joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in 2018, and secured major projects, including the Abuja–Kaduna and Lagos–Ibadan railway lines. The administration of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu (2023–present) is continuing this trajectory by aligning national development priorities with the BRI and seeking to deepen cooperation through the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) to attract greater Chinese investment.

In 2024, the two nations elevated their bilateral relationship from a ‘strategic partnership’, established in 2005, to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’, reflecting the shift from specific strategic interests to broader foreign policy alignment. A defining feature of this relationship has been consistent reciprocal support in international forums and platforms. For instance, China has backed Nigeria’s aspiration for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council.

Nigeria recognises Taiwan as part of China, in line with its support for the ‘One China’ policy. China has provided military assistance to Nigeria and participated in joint military drills, signalling the expansion of their cooperation into the security domain. In 2021, more than one-third of Nigeria’s arms imports came from China, reflecting a growing reliance on Chinese weaponry. This is partly due to Nigeria’s difficulties in complying with the requirements of the US Leahy Law, which prohibits the US Government from supplying weapons to foreign military units accused of human rights violations. As a result, China has emerged as a key alternative arms supplier for Nigeria and several other African countries.

The broader partnership between Nigeria and China also emphasises collaborative global diplomacy, with shared commitments Ehizuelen M. M. Omoruyi, ‘A Discourse on Sino-Nigeria Engagement and Possible Benefits Driving Nigeria Increasing Engagement with China’, in Five Decades of Unified Sino-Nigeria Engagement Cooperation, Zhejiang University Press and Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Hangzhou and Lagos, 2023, pp. 3– 50. to major initiatives such as the African Union’s Agenda 2063, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, FOCAC, the BRI, UN reform, and joint climate action.

Amid ongoing geopolitical competition between China and the United States, Nigeria has exercised considerable agency in selecting its diplomatic and economic partners. During former US secretary of state Antony Blinken’s African tour in 2021, Nigerian foreign minister Geoffrey Onyeama underscored the country’s pragmatic approach to managing its relationships with both powers, stressing Nigeria’s prioritisation of securing the most advantageous agreements, regardless of origin.

As an oil-exporting nation, Nigeria has historically enjoyed greater fiscal autonomy than many other African countries. When diplomatic relations with China were first established in the 1970s, Nigeria declinedEditorial Team of Biography of Fang Yi, 方毅传 [Biography of Fang Yi], p. 477. Beijing’s customary offer of interest-free loans, which were typically extended to African nations that recognised the Chinese Government. Instead, Nigeria chose to self-finance the technical assistance provided by China. This unique arrangement later helped catalyseEditorial Team of Biography of Fang Yi, 方毅传 [Biography of Fang Yi], p. 477 the development of China’s international contracting industry. By the late 1990s, Nigeria had become one of China’s leading markets in Africa.

BRI Status

In September 2018, on the sidelines of the FOCAC summit in Beijing, President Buhari pledged to cooperate with China under the BRI. This commitment was reaffirmed in October 2023, when Vice-President Kashim Shettima attended the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in China. There, he reiterated Nigeria’s dedication to strengthening BRI ties and secured 2 billion USD in science and engineering projects, along with 4 billion USD in investment commitments between Nigerian and Chinese partners.

At the World Economic Forum held in China in June 2024, Nigerian Foreign Minister Yusuf Maitama Tuggar dismissed the ‘debt trap’ narrative, arguing that it undermines Nigeria’s capacity to make informed decisions, and stressed that exaggerated risk perceptions should not deter essential investment. In September 2024, on the sidelines of the subsequent FOCAC summit in Beijing, President Bola Tinubu signed a memorandum of understanding to deepen cooperation under the BRI. In a joint statement, both parties affirmed their intention to align the BRI with Nigeria’s development priorities to foster stronger collaboration across key sectors.

Current Economic Relations

China has invested significantly in Nigerian industry and infrastructure, including the successful launch of Nigeria’s first satellite into orbit in 2011. Its ‘oil-for-infrastructure’ model—trading investment in infrastructure for access to oil—has facilitated cooperation across manufacturing, infrastructure development, and energy exploration.

Trade: Bilateral trade between Nigeria and China has grown significantly, rising from about 300 million USD in the 1990s to more than 22.6 billion USD in 2023. By 2023, Nigeria was China’s third-largest trading partner in Africa, following South Africa and Angola. In 2023, trade between the two countries accounted for roughly 8 per cent of China’s total trade with Africa. Despite this growth, the relationship is marked by significant trade imbalances. According to data from the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database, Chinese exports to Nigeria reached 18.99 billion USD in 2023, while Nigerian exports to China totalled only 1.61 billion USD.

Nigeria’s exports to China, traditionally dominated by raw commodities, are also changing. China’s oil imports from Nigeria are declining as it increasingly sources crude from Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Russia, and other Asian producers with more stable output. Between 2019 and 2023, the value of China’s crude oil imports from Russia and major Asian suppliers rose by more than 40 per cent, while imports from Nigeria fell by 61 per cent over the same period.

Infrastructure: Chinese companies have played a prominent role in Nigeria’s infrastructure development, particularly in the railway and airport sectors. According to the Chinese Ambassador to Nigeria, by 2021 China had mobilised more than 20 billion USD for major infrastructure projects in the country, especially in transportation and energy.

A flagship project is the 1,343-kilometre Lagos–Kano Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), contracted to China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC), which is intended to replace the colonial-era narrow-gauge network. The Abuja–Kaduna segment opened in July 2016 and, in May 2018, Nigeria’s transport minister secured a 6.68-billion-USD contract with CCECC for further phases, including the Ibadan–Osogbo–Ilorin (200 kilometres), Osogbo–Ado Ekiti–Ilorin–Minna (270 kilometres), and Minna–Abuja–Kaduna–Kano (305 kilometres) sections. In June 2021, the Lagos–Ibadan segment—West Africa’s first modern double-track SGR—commenced full operations.

Another major Chinese-backed project is the Lekki Deep-Sea Port, Nigeria’s first deep-sea port and one of the largest in West Africa. Operational since April 2023, the port involved more than 1 billion USD in investment, with China Harbour Engineering Company holding a 52.5 per cent majority stake. With a 14-metre draft and an annual capacity of 2.5 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs), the port is central to Nigeria’s ambition to become a regional maritime hub.

Additional key projects include the Lagos Rail Mass Transit Blue Line, West Africa’s first electrified and cross-sea light rail system, which began operations in January 2021; and the Abuja rail mass transit project, launched commercially in May 2024. The 387-kilometre Kano–Maradi railway, linking northern Nigeria with Niger, is under construction by China Communications Construction Company and other contractors. Notably, at the Third Belt and Road Forum in October 2023, China committed to refinancing and completing the Abuja–Kano and Port Harcourt–Maiduguri railways—projects previously stalled due to funding gaps. This renewed commitment stands out amid a broader post–Covid-19 decline in Chinese lending to Africa.

Investment: In 2005, in response to Nigeria’s plan to generate 40 billion barrels of oil reserves by 2010—requiring an estimated 10 billion USD annually—PetroChina signed an 800-million-USD deal to import 30,000 barrels of Nigerian oil per day, renewable annually for five years. Building on this momentum, in 2006, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) acquired a 45 per cent equity stake in the Akpo oilfield’s oil prospecting licence (OPL) 246. According to the agreement, CNOOC would receive 70 per cent of the profits, while the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) would retain the remaining 30 per cent. Licences for four additional oil blocks—OPL 471, 721, 732, and 298—were granted to China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in return for a pledged 2.27-billion-USD investment in the modernisation of the Kaduna refinery. In 2010, CNOOC secured approval for a 30 to 50-billion-USD investment in 23 offshore oilfields. China has also shown growing interest in Nigeria’s liquefied natural gas industry, with PetroChina and other firms acquiring stakes in this increasingly important sector.

By 2020, Nigeria ranked among the top five African recipients of Chinese investment, alongside Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, and Ethiopia. Chinese capital in Nigeria has expanded well beyond petroleum, encompassing both mineral extraction and downstream processing. In October 2023, for instance, China’s Ganfeng Lithium Industry Limited inaugurated a 250-million-USD lithium processing facility—a key step in developing local refining capacity in a sector critical to the green energy transition. For Nigeria, whose economy remains heavily reliant on oil and mineral production, these investments represent a significant opportunity for value-added industrialisation.

China’s role in Nigeria’s digital economy has also grown. Huawei is a dominant force in the country’s 5G infrastructure, and Chinese-backed fintech companies are making inroads in the push for financial inclusion. PalmPay, supported by Transsion and other Chinese firms, and OPay, valued at 2 billion USD, offer a broad range of financial services and have rapidly expanded their user bases in recent years.

Chinese investment has likewise supported the development of multiple industrial and special economic zones. These include projects such as Ofada Vee Tee Rice Limited, an agriculture-allied industrial venture that supports local rice farmers and rural livelihoods, and the Kajola Specialised Railway Industrial Free Trade Zone, which is designed to attract foreign investment in rail infrastructure. More than 1,000 Chinese businesses are based in Lagos’s China Town.

One of the most prominent initiatives is the Ogun Guangdong Free Trade Zone, a joint venture between the Ogun State Government (18 per cent) and a Chinese consortium (82 per cent) comprising Guangdong Xinguang International Group, China–Africa Investment Limited, and CCNC Group. The zone is focused on small-scale manufacturing. Similarly, the Lekki Free-Trade Zone (LFTZ)—established in 2007 through a partnership between China–Africa Lekki Investment Company Limited (60 per cent), the Lagos State Government (20 per cent), and its subsidiary Lekki Worldwide Investment Limited (20 per cent)—targets industries such as telecommunications, textiles, and pharmaceuticals. The LFTZ offers generous incentives, including tax holidays, full foreign ownership, and duty-free importation of raw materials. More than 60 companies are now fully operational in the zone, spanning sectors from textiles to agricultural processing. As one of the largest trade zones in West Africa, the LFTZ highlights China’s strategic role in Nigeria’s industrial development through joint ventures, infrastructure, and long-term commercial partnerships.

Lending: As Chinese lending rose across Africa in the twenty-first century, China became Nigeria’s largest bilateral creditor. However, Nigeria’s borrowing from China remains relatively modest in proportion to the size of its economy. What distinguishes Chinese loans is not just their bilateral nature but also their size—often larger than those from multilateral lenders. Between 2000 and 2022, China extended 23 loans to Nigeria worth approximately 8 billion USD, primarily targeting the information and communication technology (ICT), electricity, and transportation sectors—three core infrastructure areas in which Chinese companies are heavily involved. The Export–Import Bank of China (China Eximbank) served as the principal financier, issuing 18 loans totalling 7.6 billion USD, which accounted for about 78 per cent of Nigeria’s total borrowing from China during this period.

According to the Nigerian Debt Management Office, as of the end of 2023, Nigeria’s outstanding debt to China was 5.167 billion USD, representing 12.16 per cent of the country’s total external debt stock. Despite the relatively stable flow of funds, Chinese financing has occasionally faltered. In 2020, China Eximbank withdrew from its earlier commitment to fund the 22.8-billion-USD Kaduna–Kano railway project, citing concerns over Nigeria’s repayment capacity in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. This forced Abuja to seek interim financing from Standard Chartered, until Nigeria’s Senate approved the China Development Bank (CDB) as a replacement funder in April 2023. In January 2025, the CDB released the first tranche of 255 million USD to the railway project.

Other finance: In 2018, the Central Bank of Nigeria entered into a bilateral currency swap agreement worth 2.4 billion USD with the People’s Bank of China. Renewed in April 2021, the agreement expired in April 2024, and it remains unclear whether it has since been extended. Implementation of the swap has faced several challenges, including Nigeria’s persistent trade imbalance with China, limited domestic demand for the renminbi, and the relatively small size of the swap—accounting for just 2 per cent of the 124 billion USD in bilateral trade between 2018 and 2023. In light of ongoing depreciation of the Nigerian naira, some Nigerian legislators have recently called for the revival of the currency swap and the formal recognition of the Chinese yuan as a reserve currency to facilitate bilateral trade and reduce pressure on Nigeria’s foreign exchange reserves.

Key Controversies

Debt: The narrative of a Chinese ‘debt trap’ has entered Nigeria’s national discourse. In May 2020, the Nigerian House of Representatives launched an inquiry into Chinese loans, citing ‘global concerns about the alleged fraudulent, irregular, and underhand features of Chinese loan contracts with some African countries’. In response, Nigeria’s Debt Management Office issued a statement on 18 June 2020, titled ‘Facts About Chinese Loans to Nigeria’, which was prominently displayed on the agency’s homepage. The statement clarified that Chinese loans accounted for just 3.94 per cent of Nigeria’s total public debt and that repayments were incorporated into the national budget to reduce the risk of default.

Although the parliamentary probe appeared to have been shelved by 2021, public concern persisted—particularly around the inclusion of a ‘sovereign immunity waiver’ clause in Chinese loan agreements. Critics argued that such clauses could compromise Nigeria’s sovereignty. However, legal experts have since explained that these waivers are standard features in international project finance, designed to ensure that governments cannot unilaterally avoid dispute resolution mechanisms.

Despite these clarifications, controversy has continued, fuelled by a 2021 arbitration case in which a Chinese company successfully targeted Nigerian assets abroad. Following a 70-million-USD judgement, the company seized Nigerian guesthouses in the United Kingdom and three presidential jets in France. This episode has further stoked suspicions that some Chinese loans may be structured with a high risk of failure, potentially leading to asset seizures and reinforcing debt-trap anxieties.

Treatment of Nigerian citizens in China: Racism against Nigerians in China has remained a persistent issue, fuelling heightened tensions during the Covid-19 pandemic. On 10 April 2020, footage went viral of Nigerian diplomat Razaq Lawal publicly denouncing the mistreatment of Nigerians in Guangzhou. Highlighting the disparity between this discrimination and Nigeria’s fair treatment of Chinese nationals during the pandemic, Lawal alleged that Nigerians’ passports had been confiscated and they were subjected to quarantine periods longer than those imposed on Chinese citizens. The incident provoked widespread anti-Chinese sentiment in Nigeria, prompting the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Femi Gbajabiamila, to summon then Chinese ambassador Zhou Pingjian to provide an explanation.

Reflecting the complex and at times strained nature of people-to-people relations between the two countries, the Nigerian Medical Association also expressed disapproval of the government’s decision to invite a Chinese medical team to assist in responding to the pandemic.

Labour practices: Significant concerns have been raised about unethical labour practices among some Chinese enterprises operating in Nigeria, including allegations of worker exploitation, aggression by Chinese managers, and conditions described by workers as resembling slavery. These issues have long attracted criticism from the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), which argued at a 2013 trilateral meeting that China prioritises its own industrialisation over Africa’s development, focusing on raw material extraction rather than supporting regional industrial growth. Trade unions such as the National Union of Civil Engineering, Construction, Furniture and Wood Workers have accused Chinese businesses of violating Nigerian labour laws and international standards. In 2014, they issued a 14-day ultimatum calling for government intervention to address these violations.

In 2023, the NLC organised protests and picketing actions to raise concerns about casualisation, breaches of safety standards, and abuses of Nigeria’s expatriate quota system. Although reports of Chinese convict labour being used in Nigeria have been debunked, unease remains over the employment of Chinese labourers in low-skilled jobs, which many argue restricts opportunities for Nigerian workers—especially given China’s strict enforcement against undocumented foreign labourers within its own borders.

Competition with imported Chinese goods: Nigeria’s industries continue to face structural challenges—including limited access to power, capital, and technology—that hinder their ability to compete with Chinese imports. While there have been collaborative ventures, such as United Nigerian Textiles Limited’s partnership with Chinese firms, the influx of Chinese products, particularly in the textile sector, has had a detrimental impact on domestic enterprises. This tension has fuelled public discontent, exemplified by protests against Chinese imports in Kano in 2015. Four years earlier, then governor of the Central Bank Sanusi Lamido Sanusi warned against excessive reliance on Chinese goods and urged greater investment in domestic production and consumption.

Despite these concerns, Chinese goods—including contaminated, substandard, and counterfeit products such as fake pharmaceuticals—remain widely available in Nigeria. Their prevalence is partly sustained by smuggling networks and partnerships with local traders. While the Chinese Government maintains that its exports are competitively priced rather than inferior in quality, a widespread perception persists in Nigeria that Chinese products are unreliable and of lower quality.

Key Sources

Books, Reports, and Scholarly Articles

Blair, Alex. 2023. ‘The FDI Landscape in Nigeria in 2023.’ Investment Monitor, 26 June. Link.

Bräutigam, Deborah, and Xiaoyang Tang. 2011. ‘African Shenzhen: China’s Special Economic Zones in Africa.’ The Journal of Modern African Studies 49(1): 27–54.

Chen, Irene Yuan Sun, Rex U. Ukaejiofo, Tang Xaioyang, and Deborah Brautigam. 2016. Learning from China? Manufacturing, Investment, and Technology Transfer in Nigeria. SAIS China Africa Research Initiative Working Paper 2, January. Washington, DC: School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. Link.

Ibonye, Vincent. 2017. ‘China–Africa Cooperation: Struggling Commodities and the Silver Lining in the Innovation Economy.’ International Area Studies Review 20(2): 160–78.

Ibonye, Vincent. 2023. ‘The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Nigeria–China Economic Cooperation.’ In Five Decades of Unified Sino-Nigeria Engagement Cooperation, edited by Ehizuelen M.M. Omoruyi, 66–81. Hangzhou, China, and Lagos: Zhejiang University Press and Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.

Moses, Oyintarelado, Jyhjong Hwang, Lucas Engel, and Victoria Yvonne Bien-Aime. 2023. A New State of Lending: Chinese Loans to Africa. GCI Policy Brief 019, 09/2023. Boston, MA: GDP Center, Boston University. Link.

Tom-Jack, Pamela I. 2016. The Evolving Geopolitical Relations of Nigeria and China: What is the Impact of the Nigeria–China Trade and Direct Investment on the Nigerian Economy? Public and International Affairs Research Papers, 27 April. Ottawa: University of Ottawa. Link.

Usman, Zainab, and Xiaoyang Tang. 2024. ‘How Is China’s Economic Transition Affecting Its Relations with Africa?’ 30 May. New Delhi: Carnegie India. Link.

Cover Image: Lagos, Nigeria. Source: Sentinel Hub (CC).

Historical Background

Republic of the Congo (RoC) and China were connected long before the African country achieved independence from France in 1960 and even before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. In 1929, a few hundred Chinese workers were recruited by the General Government of French Indochina to work in the mountainous region of Mayombe to build the Congo–Ocean Railway (also known by the French name Chemin de fer Congo–Océan) linking the Atlantic port of Pointe-Noire to Brazzaville. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the then newly independent RoC and the PRC in 1964, the two countries have remained on good terms. RoC President Denis Sassou Nguesso, who first came to power in 1979 and has ruled the country for 37 of the past 42 years, has visited China 15 times since 1980 (as of May 2021), while Xi Jinping has visited Congo once, in 2013, on his first diplomatic tour of African countries as the President of China.

From 1964 to 1978, trade between the two countries increased rapidly and was conducted through a barter-like system in which both sides took account of the goods traded and kept the trade in balance, without using foreign exchange. In 1978, both countries began to use foreign exchange for the payment of trade. From 1983 to 1992, exports from the PRC to the RoC experienced a downturn due to the decrease in oil income in Congo and the shortage of major goods in China, such as rice and dried fish, for export to Congo. Only later in the 1990s, and especially after the short but bloody civil war that erupted in the RoC in 1997–98, did bilateral trade resume its steady growth. China has been the RoC’s largest trading partner since 2014 and, according to the latest available data at the time of writing, in 2019, the bilateral trade volume had reached 6.5 billion USD.

In 1984, the two governments signed an agreement to establish the Mixed Commission for Economic, Trade, and Technical Cooperation (Commission mixte de coopération économique, commerciale et technique), a body tasked with facilitating bilateral trade and economic cooperation. This platform remains active and held its tenth meeting on 29 October 2020. In 2000, the Congolese and Chinese authorities also signed an agreement on the promotion and protection of mutual investment. This agreement set up a framework for coordinating such issues as investor privilege, expropriation, compensation, transfers of capital and profits, and dispute resolution in trade and investment between China and Congo. During the state visit of President Sassou Nguesso to China in 2016, the relationship between the RoC and the PRC was elevated to the level of ‘comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership’—one of the highest categories of bilateral relations in China’s diplomatic jargon.

BRI Status

The RoC has been involved in a series of cooperation programs with China, including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In 2016, during President Sassou Nguesso’s state visit to China, the RoC was listed as one of the ‘pilot countries’ for cooperation in productive capacity between China and Africa (中非产能合作先行先试示范国家). A series of potential projects has been launched under this framework, including the Special Economic Zone of Pointe-Noire. The framework agreement for this cooperative project was signed during the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2018. Also during this summit, the two governments signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the BRI.

Yet, rather than the BRI, most of the recent cooperative projects between the two countries fall under the framework of the ‘Eight Major Initiatives’ (EMI) between China and Africa proposed by President Xi at the FOCAC. The EMI covers industrial promotion, infrastructure connectivity, trade facilitation, green development, capacity-building, healthcare, people-to-people exchanges, and peace and security. As China’s Ministry of Commerce has explained, the EMI overlaps with the BRI in many aspects. The EMI was central to the agenda of both the latest meeting of the Mixed Commission in 2020 and the fifth Investing in Africa Forum (Forum Investir en Afrique), an event sponsored by the Government of the RoC, China’s Ministry of Finance, the China Development Bank, and the World Bank. Held in RoC’s capital, Brazzaville, in September 2019, the forum formulated the direction of the cooperation between China and the RoC towards the realisation of the EMI’s goals.

Current Economic Relations

Trade: The RoC enjoys a trade surplus with China due to exports of crude oil, minerals, and timber. In 2019, China’s exports to the RoC were valued at 440 million USD, while its imports from the RoC were worth 6.05 billion USD. The RoC is the second-largest African exporterp.35 of crude oil to China, after Angola. Congo exported its first 23,000 tonnes of iron ore to China in April 2019, joining the ranks of iron ore–exporting countries.

Investment: Foreign direct investment (FDI) by China in the RoC was worth 94.59 million USD in 2019, bringing the stock to 610 million USD by the end of the year. A few Chinese-invested projects are worth more than 100 million USD. Among them is the Kayo Oil Field, prospected and exploited by Wing Wah Petrochemical, a subsidiary of the Southernpec Group (南方石化集团), which is now in regular production. Another noteworthy project is the Soremi copper mine, which started production in 2017. Soremi is the first overseas project of the state-owned China National Gold Group Corporation (中国黄金集团), and the first mine in Congo that integrates mining and smelting. In the financial sector, the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) has formed a joint venture with Congolese public and private investors to form the BSCA Bank, in which the ABC holds half of the shares. In 2019, the Congolese Government partnered with West-African Group (西非集团), a Chinese private company, to set up the Fonds national de développement du Congo (FNDC), which aims to promote investment in agriculture, industry, tourism, health, and education in RoC.

Figure 1

Chinese companies play a major role in the construction sector in the RoC, with a market share of more than 70%. In 2019, Chinese companies won 38 contracts for construction projects worth a total of 297 million USD. Examples of new large-scale construction projects include housing projects in Pointe-Noire and Owando contracted to the Shandong Zijian Construction Group and the maintenance of National Roads 1 and 2 contracted to the China State Construction Engineering Corporation.

Aid: China has been a significant provider of aid to the RoC, ranging from turnkey construction projects to medical teams. Recent aid projects include the grand library of the University of Marien Ngouabi, delivered in 2016, the Sino-Congolese Friendship Hospital, completed in 2013, and the new parliament building, delivered in 2021. Since 1966, China has been sending medical teams to Congo to provide medical services to local people as part of its foreign aid program, with the twenty-seventh such medical team dispatched in October 2020, in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic. Since the outbreak of the pandemic, China has also donated medical supplies to RoC.

Key Controversies in Bilateral Relations

A significant, controversial aspect of China’s engagement with Congo is debt. Congo’s major creditors include multilateral development banks, bilateral creditors such as China and France, and major commodities trading companies such as Glencore and Trafigura. As of 2019, RoC’s total public debt stood at 85% of its gross domestic product (GDP), with China the country’s largest creditor. Negotiations on restructuring the RoC’s debt with China, which amounted to 2.2 billion USDp. 33 as of September 2019, started in 2017, and concluded in April 2019. In June 2021, it was reported that Congo had again requested further rescheduling of its debt with China, to which President Xi agreed.

According to the agreement reached between RoC and the Export–Import Bank of China in 2019, Congo will repay one-third of the debt owed to China generated between 2010 and 2014 in the three years after the agreement comes into effect, while the maturity on the rest will be extended by 15 years. The loans covered by the agreement involved eight construction contracts, most of which if not all were contracted to Chinese companies. The annual interest rate on seven of the loans was fixed at 1.5%, and at 2% for the other. Since 2015, many Congolese and Chinese companies have experienced great difficulty in getting paid for the work they had already done, and many projects under construction have been halted, as observed during the author’s fieldwork. The 2019 debt restructuring agreement opened the way for the RoC to negotiate a bailout program from the International Monetary Fund, as the restructuring of the debts with China was an essential part of this program. China also provided pandemic-related debt relief, forgiving interest-free loans granted to Congo that matured at the end of 2020, although the value of these loans is unclear.

Key Sources

Local Media Outlets:

La Semaine Africaine

Les Dépêches de Brazzaville

Vox Congo

Books and Reports:

Bokilo, Julien. 2012. La Chine au Congo-Brazzaville: Stratégie de l’enracinement et conséquences sur le développement en Afrique [China in Congo-Brazzaville: Roots Strategy and Consequences for Development in Africa]. Paris: L’Harmattan.

Cover Photo: Panorama Mayombe, Niari, Republic of Congo. Credit: (CC) Christophe André.

Historical Background

South Africa’s official diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began on 1 January 1998 following a long period of relations with Taiwan. During the 1970s, the apartheid regime in South Africa, subject to an embargo and isolated internationally, turned towards Taiwan, equally in search of international allies. The ensuing engagement resulted in the influx of capital and investors from Taiwan (benefitting from special incentives), with the latter often setting up factories in proximity of bantustans or homelands, specifically created during the apartheid years as a way to segregate population groups and create basins of cheap labour. If, according to official accounts, the PRC had no diplomatic or trade relations with apartheid South Africa, in reality ties were much more complex. Due to the tensions between Maoist China and the Soviet Union, Beijing provided support to the largely ineffective Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) from the mid-1960s to the end of the 1980s, as the African National Congress (ANC) was shouldered by the Soviet Union. As detailed in the book Apartheid Guns and Money, evidence from declassified documents shows that Beijing did in fact supply the apartheid military with guns and bombs from at least 1980. The PRC proved to be at ease playing both sides. 

With the advent of democracy in 1994 and the subsequent normalisation of diplomatic relations with over 180 countries, the new ANC government debated the salience of maintaining ties with Taiwan. When President Mandela took office, the new government was keen to drop the image of the past while trying to draw closer to countries able to help its development trajectory. Mandela first suggested a dual recognition, which was rejected by Beijing due to its One China Principle. Eventually, South Africa could not avoid establishing official ties with Mainland China, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and, at the time, an emerging economic power. During Thabo Mbeki’s time in office (1999–2008), South Africa’s agenda was primarily focused on bringing forth an African renaissance and the launch of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001, with the aim of strengthening aid and investments linkages with G8 countries. Relations with the PRC, although friendly, remained somewhat secondary during this period.

The sudden ousting of President Mbeki in 2009 provided an opportunity for Beijing to draw closer to one of the main economic drivers on the African continent. In parallel, the delayed repercussions of the 2008 financial crisis in South Africa and the recognition of the PRC’s ability to weather the negative consequences of the crisis led the new government of Jacob Zuma (2009–18) to develop an interest in learning from China’s developmental state approach. This mutual wish to strengthen cooperation and exchanges led to the elevation of bilateral ties to the level of ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ during a state visit to China by President Zuma in 2010. At the same time, South Africa’s relationship with the PRC was also reinforced through the country’s membership in other broader international groupings such as the BRICS (that is Brazil, Russia, India, China, and after 2010 also South Africa) or the G20. As a reflection of its political and economic weight (whether regionally or continentally), South Africa not only hosted the sixth ministerial Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit in 2015, but also received official visits from both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping (in 1999 and 2010 respectively), when they were vice-presidents on their first official Africa tours. Since taking office in 2013, President Xi Jinping has visited South Africa three times in 2013, 2015, and 2018, and received Zuma in 2014. His successor Cyril Ramaphosa was received by Xi Jinping in 2018.

While the official relationship between the PRC and South Africa has intensified over the last decade, public diplomacy displays mean little to ordinary South Africans. In reality, the tangibility of the Chinese presence in the country transpires primarily through the numbers and diversity of migrants. Chinese migration to South Africa has been tied to different waves and histories. The earliest dates back to the late nineteenth century and was driven by the gold rush, followed by Taiwanese industrialists in the 1970s, then entrepreneurs from the mainland from the late 1980s onwards, most of whom arrived after the turn of the century. In the absence of official figures, estimates have ranged from 350,000 to 500,000 during the mid-2000s, with a very likely decline in recent years due to a less favourable business environment. Even if trajectories, identities, and engagements with the host society vary, and economic footprints range from corporate capital to private initiatives at different scales, imaginaries of ‘China’ and ‘the Chinese’ are largely associated with wholesale trade. The combination of a dearth in supply and a high demand for large quantities of affordable goods triggered a considerable influx of migrant-entrepreneurs eager to benefit from these economic opportunities and eventually led to the mushrooming of Chinese-run shopping malls, especially in Johannesburg, the country’s economic powerhouse.  

BRI Status

South Africa officially joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) during a state visit by Chinese president Xi Jinping in early December 2015, which coincided with the sixth FOCAC summit in Johannesburg. In parallel, both governments agreed to strengthen the joint working group, initially set up in 2014 to implement an action plan covering a range of different economic areas. These included, among others, locomotive procurement, civilian nuclear energy, investment cooperation in industrial parks, trade promotion (especially focused on South African product expos and trade missions), cooperation in black industrialist programmes, financial cooperation, as well as the upgrading of the national electricity transmission and distribution system. While the signed MoU mentions the joint building of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st century Maritime Silk Road, it is difficult to assess which projects fall under the BRI, BRICS, FOCAC, or simply bilateral agreements. 

Current Economic Relations

Trade: By 2008, merely ten years after the formal establishment of diplomatic ties, the PRC had already turned into South Africa’s largest import and export partner. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, imports from main commercial partners, such as Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) members and EU countries dropped significantly. However, South Africa’s trade balance with the PRC runs a deficit. Additionally, while South Africa mainly exports raw materials, especially mineral products and base metals, textiles, precious and semi-precious stones, as well as wood products, imports from China are mainly value-added products such as electrical machinery, clothing and footwear, data processing machines, organic chemicals, iron or steel articles, and motor vehicles. From 2008 to 2018, imports from mainland China have increased from 8.6 billion USD to 16.3 billion USD, compared to 4.3 billion USD to 8.5 billion USD in South African exports in the other direction (data from the China Africa Research Initiative). However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, bilateral trade between South Africa and China fell by 27.6% in 2020, mirroring a sharp contraction in international trade and investment. The decline in exports to China (which began in 2019) is mainly due to a declining demand for ores and concentrates, possibly due to China’s changing economy. Data from the South African Revenue Service from October 2020 shows that, for the first time in over a decade, China had dropped to the third position (at 8.9%) in terms of exports from South Africa behind Germany (9.1%) and the United States (12.2%). Imports, on the other hand, remained firmly dominated by China (with 19.8%), ahead of Germany (10.1%) and the United States (7%).

Investment: Compared to the exponential growth of bilateral trade, the reality of Chinese investment is very different. Considering the size of South Africa’s economy, direct investment from China was initially very modest. Until 2007, South African companies had even invested more in China than their counterparts had in South Africa, an unusual setup considering predominant trends across the African continent. A number of factors can explain the largely cautious approach adopted by Chinese investors. While South Africa is rich in resources, it is viewed as having reached a mature stage of development, which limits interests in mining from foreign investors. Additionally, the complex regulatory environment, a rigid labour market, the influence of trade and labour unions, as well as the existence of positive discrimination policies (such as Black Economic Empowerment) have affected investor sentiment. Those who have invested in mining operations have largely opted for joint-ventures and brownfield investment. This includes the 243-million-USD purchase made by China Investment Corporation (China’s sovereign wealth fund) of 25% of the Shanduka group (a South African company with investments in energy, mining, telecommunications, and financial services), and the joint 200-million-USD acquisition of 45% of Wesizwe (a publicly listed mining corporation) by the Jinchuan Group, a provincial state-owned Chinese company, and the China-Africa Development Fund. 

The largest investment to date occurred in 2008, when the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) purchased a 20% equity stake in Standard Bank for 5.5 billion USD, becoming the bank’s largest shareholder. Over time, the interest of Chinese investors has grown, especially during Zuma’s time in office, when the foreign policy strategy geared towards establishing closer links with Asia. During Zuma’s state visit to China in 2010, South African and Chinese companies signed more than a dozen agreements covering investments in railways, power transmission construction, mining, insurance, telecoms, and nuclear power, including some projects that eventually turned out to be quite controversial, as outlined below. The opening of the China Africa Development Fund’s (CADF) representative office in Johannesburg in 2009 contributed to raising awareness about investment opportunities in the country, specifically by providing support for Chinese companies willing to invest. By the end of 2012, this private equity fund, solely funded by the China Development Bank (CDB), was involved in seven projects in South Africa, five of which were in manufacturing and two in mining, with a total investment of over 400 million USD. In 2013, a consortium led by the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Limited and Hebei Iron & Steel Group invested over 600 million USD (partially guaranteed through a loan by the CADF) to acquire the Palabora Mining Company from Rio Tinto. 

By 2012, about 25% of Chinese foreign direct investments in Africa had been funnelled into South Africa, followed by 11% into Nigeria and 9% into Zambia. For all that, by 2008 Chinese investments in South Africa only made up 4% (or 3.6 billion USD) of all foreign investment in the country. Between 2003 and 2019, a total of 88 (registered) Chinese companies had invested in South Africa with capital expenditure (stock) evaluated at 6.1 billion USD. Former Chinese ambassador to South Africa Lin Songtian stated that by 2017 existent and planned direct Chinese investments in the country added up to 25 billion USD (ranging from manufacturing, processing, mining, finance, energy, tourism, as well as trade and service sectors). This figure is difficult to verify, not only given the discrepancy between promised and realised projects, but also due to the reality of investments by migrant-entrepreneurs not being fully captured. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence shows an upturn in interest from Chinese investors in the 2010s. In recent years, the Coega Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Nelson Mandela Bay has become an attractive investment destination for Chinese investors, with a Chinese firm involved in the manufacturing of solar photovoltaic cells, as well as two vehicle manufacturers, First Automotive Works (FAW) and Beijing Automotive Industry Group (BAIC), opening plants to manufacture cars to be marketed locally and across the continent (for more details, see the BAIC SA Vehicle Assembly Plant profile at this link). Furthermore, Shenzhen Hoi Mor Resources, a Chinese company specialised in mineral beneficiation, has committed to invest 3.8 billion USD to operate the 8,000-hectare Musina Makhado SEZ, situated on the Limpopo River’s southern bank in the province of Limpopo (for more details, see the South African Energy Metallurgical SEZ profile at this link). To be developed over the next years, the project comprises a metallurgical complex (with 1.5 billion USD to be spent on a ferrochrome plant and 1.2 billion USD on a stainless steel smelter) and a logistics hub to produce stainless steel. It has been touted by the South African government as the main driver of foreign direct investment in the country, with the investment figure of 2.6 billion USD in 2017 ballooning to 9.5 billion USD in January 2020, based on pledges by nine Chinese companies. Furthermore, in 2018, ahead of the 10th BRICS summit held in South Africa, Xi also pledged to invest 14.7 billion USD in South Africa, but not many details were released. The proclaimed aim was to help reboot a struggling economy, riddled by a decade of government looting and state corruption under Zuma’s presidency.

Aid and other finance: Although it is one of the most unequal societies, South Africa also remains one of the richest and industrially most advanced countries on the continent. Being classified as a middle-income country, aid has not really been at the forefront of its cooperation with China. A working paper by the Center for Global Development states that, between 2000 and 2011, South Africa received a total of 2.3 billion USD from China in development finance (policy-motivated loans). More recently, in light of a deflated economy and the struggling public sector, Chinese banks in 2018 lent a combined 2.8 billion USD to heavily indebted state-owned enterprises. The South African state power utility Eskom received a loan of 2.5 billion USD from the China Development Bank (CDB) and a loan of 300 million USD was extended by the ICBC to the logistics company Transnet. A few months later, South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation claimed that the country had secured a commitment to loan 25 billion USD from the Chinese government, including 15 billion USD pledged in the context of the 2018 FOCAC summit. In April 2019, with the payment of the first tranche by the CDB having failed to materialise, Eskom required an emergency bailout of 355 million USD in order to stop a ruinous debt default. More recently, during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in mid-2020, the Chinese government donated personal protection equipment (PPE), which was also replicated at a lower scale by Chinese businesses and associations donating PPE and food parcels to disadvantaged areas across South Africa.

Key Controversies

• The aforementioned 25 billion-USD loan pledged by the Chinese government aimed towards funding a large proportion of South Africa’s economic stimulus package, has been considered controversial due to its size and lack of public information. Not knowing anything about the nature of the loan, the currency, interest rates, repayment period, and the actual expenditure, opposition parties criticised the loan as possibly steering South Africa into a ‘debt trap’.
• Jacob Zuma’s presidency (2009–18) has come to be associated with state capture, corruption, and looting of government entities at previously unparalleled levels. The Gupta brothers, three Indian businessmen who at that time were based in South Africa, conspired with various politicians (including Zuma) and heads of state-owned enterprises to influence decision-making and advance their own business interests. One of the many scandals was linked to the partial renewal of Transnet’s locomotive fleet and directly involved CRRC, a Beijing-based rail conglomerate. By paying kickbacks to companies linked to the Guptas, China South Rail (CSR) and China North Rail (CNR), later renamed CRRC, won either large parts or the entirety of successive tenders for locomotives. In 2012, Transnet awarded CRRC a contract for 95 locomotives worth 333 million USD. In 2014, another contract for 100 locomotives was awarded to CSR for the sum of 422 million USD, roughly 114 million USD higher than what the Japanese company Mitsui had reportedly quoted. Transnet paid an excessive upfront payment of 60% before the first locomotive was even delivered. As for the largest tender, 1,064 locomotives (599 electric and 465 diesel), Transnet changed the adjudication criteria mid-stream and split both the electric and diesel bids in two, to ensure that CSR Zhuzhou (a subsidiary of CSR) and CNR were each awarded a significant proportion of the contract, despite not attaining the highest scores during the tender process. In all three instances, either the contract value had been inflated, documents altered, or the tendering process flawed. According to investigative journalistic reports, the Transnet locomotive suppliers had pledged roughly 545 million USD in kickbacks to the Guptas, 224 million of which had been paid. In December 2019, following a complete overhaul of its leadership structure, Transnet planned to approach the courts to have a number of controversial contracts linked to the procurement of the 1,064 locomotives declared unlawful, which led to a freezing of the funds. A year later, the South African Revenue Service went to court to claim back a large sum of money from CRRC, based on evidence about the company having paid kickbacks to the Guptas.
• The Dalai Lama visited South Africa in 1996, meeting with then President Nelson Mandela, but he has been denied entry to South Africa ever since. In 2009, he was invited to a Nobel laureates’ peace conference, but the South African government argued his presence would detract attention from the 2010 World Cup. In 2011, he could not attend archbishop Desmond Tutu’s 80th birthday, with a South African court ruling a year later that the failing to grant him a visa in time by authorities was unlawful. In 2014, he was again refused entry to attend the 14th world summit of Nobel peace laureates. These repeated refusals caused a political debate in the country, with some accusing the South African government of being spineless and selling its sovereignty to China, compromising on its post-apartheid mission of commitment to human rights and democracy, and others pointed to the risk of possible negative economic consequences of angering China. In 2018, Lobsang Sangay, the president of the Tibetan government in exile, visited South Africa, temporarily straining relations with China. A planned lecture by Sangay at the University of Stellenbosch had to be cancelled due to local people protesting outside. While the then Chinese ambassador to South Africa claimed that all public activities were cancelled ‘due to the furious opposition and rejection from people across society’, Sangay is no household name in South Africa. According to conversations that the author of this profile had with scholars on campus that day, some of the workers (e.g. maintenance staff, cleaners, gardeners) mentioned that they were given some monetary compensation to protest against someone they had never heard of before.
• There are fears that the Chinese-funded Musina Makhado SEZ in northern Limpopo will have seriously damaging environmental consequences for the Limpopo River. In January 2020, opposition MPs inquired about the Environmental Impact Assessment, but no information seemed to exist on the potential impact of the controversial SEZ on the millions of people living downstream of Musina, whether in South Africa, Mozambique, or Zimbabwe. The South African government considers this SEZ initiative as a flagship project and emerging regional economic epicentre, even if the planned mineral resource extraction and connected industries are very polluting. Since the Limpopo Economic Development Agency has given priority to a Chinese investor, an earlier project by a local company, aimed at building the first zero-solid-waste eco-industrial park, has been sidelined and there are serious doubts about beneficial impacts for the province. Furthermore, the chairman of Shenzhen Hoi Mor Resources, Mr Ning Yat Hoi, and main holder of the SEZ permit, is wanted by Interpol for fraud, which, apart from the criminal aspect, has caused concerns among potential funders. 
• In 2013, Zendai Group, a property developer from Shanghai, announced its plans to build the ‘New York of Africa’ in Modderfontein in the form of a massive 7-billion-USD urban development to be spent over 15–20 years (for more details, see the Modderfontein New City project profile at this link). The Chinese investor envisioned building a modern new city on 1,600 hectares of land, located in the northeast of Johannesburg. While approved by the provincial government, the City government of Johannesburg deemed the Modderfontein New City development to be too economically exclusive without including a sufficiently strong social and affordable housing component, subsequently forcing the developer to resubmit its plans. In 2015, Dai Zhikang, the founder and CEO of Zendai, surprisingly sold all his shares, which led to a splintering of ownership and an ensuing abandonment of the project. In addition to the controversy surrounding the nature of the project, the Economic Freedom Fighters, a leftist and very vocal opposition party, criticised the sale of 1,600 hectares of land to a Chinese development for ‘putting South African on sale in the world’s markets for the benefits of global ruthless capital’.
• In the early 2000s, South African labour unions attributed the continuous decline of the local textile and clothing industry since 1994, both in terms of GDP and in numbers, to the growing competition caused by imports from Asia, in particular from China. The competitiveness of the South African clothing and textile industry was severely affected by the currency appreciation between 2003 and 2010 in addition to rising labour costs, and, internationally, by China’s dominant position as the leading producer of affordable textiles and clothing. Following pressure from the Confederation of South African Trade Unions, at the time a close ally of the ruling party, the South African government imposed a two-year import quota on 200 clothing items (effective between 2006 and 2008), with the agreement of China. These measures, however, had little impact and did not stop the decline of the industry.

Key Sources

English-Language Media:

Local media outlets in English include Daily Maverick, Mail & Guardian, Business Day, City Press, News24, Independent Online, and New Frame.

Research Institutes:

• South African Institute of International Affairs
• Institute for Global Dialogue
• Africa-China Reporting Project

Books, Reports, and Scholarly Articles:

• Alden, Christopher and Yu-Shan Wu (eds.). 2021.  South Africa-China Relations: A Partnership of Paradoxes. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Alden, Christopher and Yu-Shan Wu. 2014. ‘South Africa and China: The Making of a Partnership.’ Occasional Paper 199, South African Institute of International Affairs. Link.
• Anthony, Ross, Sven Grimm, and Yejoo Kim. 2014. ‘South Africa’s Relations with China and Taiwan: Economic Realism and the ‘One China’ Doctrine.’ Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch University. Link.
• Ballard, Richard and Philip Harrison. 2019. ‘Transnational Urbanism Interrupted: A Chinese Developer’s Attempts to Secure Approval to Build the “New York of Africa” at Modderfontein, Johannesburg.’ Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 52, no. 2: 383–402.
• Dittgen, Romain. 2017. ‘Features of Modernity, Development and “Orientalism”: Reading Johannesburg through Its ‘Chinese’ Urban Spaces.’ Journal of Southern African Studies 43, no. 5: 979–96.
• Dittgen, Romain and Ross Anthony. 2018. ‘Yellow, Red and Black: Fantasies about China and ‘the Chinese’ in Contemporary South Africa.’ In Yellow Perils: China Narratives in the Contemporary World, edited by Frank Billé and Sören Urbansky. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press, 108–41.
• Harris, Karen L. 2019. ‘Untangling Centuries of South African Chinese Diasporas: Molluscs/Abalone, Ungulates/Rhinos and Equidae/Donkeys.’ South African Historical Journal 71, no. 2: 263–81.
• Harrison, Philip, Yan Yang, and Moyo Khangelani. 2017. ‘Visual Representations in South Africa of China and the Chinese People.’ Journal of African Cultural Studies 29, no. 1: 25–45.
• Harrison, Philip, Moyo Khangelani, and Yan Yang. 2012. ‘Strategy and Tactics: Chinese Immigrant and Diasporic Spaces in Johannesburg, South Africa.’ Journal of Southern African Studies 38, no. 4: 899–925.
• Huang, Mingwei. 2020. ‘The Chinatown Back Room: The Afterlife of Apartheid Architectures.’ In Anxious Joburg: The Inner Lives of a Global South City, edited by Nicky Falkhof and Cobus van Staden. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
• Huynh, T. Tu. 2018. ‘China Town Malls in South Africa in the 21st Century: Ethnic Chinatowns or Chinese State Projects?’ Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 27, no. 1: 28–54.
• Huynh, T. Tu, Yoon J. Park, and Anna Y. Chen. 2010. ‘Faces of China: New Chinese Migrants in South Africa, 1980s to Present.’ African and Asian Studies 9: 286–306.
• Le Pere, Garth and Garth Shelton. 2007. China, Africa and South Africa. Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue.
• Lin, Edwin. 2014. ‘“Big fish in a small pond”: Chinese migrant shopkeepers in South Africa.’ International Migration Review 48, no. 1: 181-215.
• Park, Yoon J. 2008. A Matter of Honour: Being Chinese in South Africa. Johannesburg: Jacana Media. 
• Park, Yoon J. 2010. ‘Chinese Enclaves Communities and Their Impact on South African Society.’ In Strengthening the Civil Society Perspective: China’s African Impact, edited by Stephen Marks. Fahamu, Cape Town: Emerging Powers in Africa Programme, 113–27.
• Park, Yoon J. 2013. ‘Perceptions of Chinese in Southern Africa: Constructions of the ‘Other’ and the Role of Memory.’ African Studies Review 56, no. 1: 131–53.
• Reboredo, Ricardo and Frances Brill. 2019. ‘Between Global and Local: Urban Inter-referencing and the Transformation of a Sino-South African Megaproject.’ China Perspectives, 4/2019: 9–16. 

Updates & Corrections

30 September 2021: Internal links to other project profiles in South Africa added.

Cover Photo: Johannesburg South Africa. Credit (CC): @mediaclubsouthafrica.

Historical Background

Zimbabwe’s political, economic, and people-to-people relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are regarded as some of the most robust on the African continent, chiefly owing to the historical relationship between the two countries. The beginning of the relationship can be traced back to the southern African nation’s armed struggle for independence in the 1970s. It was during this time—a period replete with Cold War proxy wars and ideological battles—that China provided the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by Robert Mugabe, with training, weapons, and logistical support for their armed struggle, an assistance that was crucial for its final success. The ZANU also made use of Mao Zedong’s teachings on guerrilla warfare as a training manual for their cadres. The ZANLA, together with the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army, the armed wing of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union led by Joshua Nkomo (an organisation that was supported by the Soviet Union), fought against Rhodesian forces until 1979. At Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, China became one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the new state now led by Robert Mugabe.

When Mugabe became Prime Minister in 1980, he pronounced and implemented an independent (non-aligned) and pragmatic foreign policy. His first speech at the United Nations in 1980 indicated this direction. This was also in line with China’s anti-imperialist foreign policy doctrine at the time. However, on the ground Mugabe had more beneficial political and economic relations with Britain and the West than with China, despite the fact that the country had helped his regime to bring about Zimbabwe’s independence. This was reflected in the fact that in 1980 China was not invited to a Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) exercise which was chiefly conducted by the British through the British Military Assistance and Training Team (BMATT). In the following years, Mugabe went on to get a knighthood from Britain, as well as significant aid from Western countries, including the United States. This included 417 million USD from the World Bank and 204 million USD from the USA between 1980 and 1985. This funding was intended for post-war infrastructural development initiatives such as building schools and hospitals.

While leaning towards the West, true to his pragmatic policy, Robert Mugabe also maintained a cordial relationship with China. This was meant to strengthen his leverage and enlarge the room for manoeuvre in his interactions with other external partners. As a result, in 1981 and 1985 he travelled to Beijing and obtained aid and loans for various infrastructure projects, such as the National Sports Stadium in Harare. During Mugabe’s 1985 visit to China, the two countries also established a Joint Economic and Trade Commission, and the most recent meeting was held in 2017. In 1989 Robert Mugabe repaid China’s goodwill towards his regime by supporting China’s Tiananmen Square crackdown. 

However, from the turn of the twenty-first century, Zimbabwe lost favour with the West as the government led by Mugabe was sanctioned for human rights violations, resorting to state-sanctioned political violence against opposition parties, and implementing a violent land reform programme in which the state forcibly took land occupied by white people and redistributed it to black people. It was in this context that in 2003 Mugabe fully embraced the support of the Chinese government through the Look East Policy (LEP). That year, Mugabe announced that Zimbabwe was going back to those who had historically been its truest friends, that is China. As a result, China then began to increase trade with, investment in, and aid to the southern African state, and also began to defend it at crucial international fora. For instance, following a sham election run-off in June 2008, which was preceded by widespread state-sponsored violence against the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)—the opposition led by Morgan Tsvangirai—China together with Russia vetoed a proposed UN resolution to sanction Zimbabwe at the Security Council. After the removal of Mugabe from power in 2017 through a military takeover, Emmerson Mnangagwa, the new civilian leader, has continued to tout China as Zimbabwe’s all-weather friend. At the same time, some Western countries—including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia—have maintained sanctions on the country, accusing the Mnangagwa Administration of continuing to ‘use state-sanctioned violence against peaceful protestors and civil society, as well as against labour leaders and members of the political opposition’. In such a context, the political interactions between Zimbabwe and China have continued to grow in importance to the point that, in 2018, the bilateral relationship has been elevated to the level of a ‘comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership’. 

BRI Status

Zimbabwe was not invited to be part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) until 2019, after the country’s Minister of Information, Monica Mutsvangwa,  attended of the Belt and Road Forum. Although little activity or discussion about the BRI has taken place in the country since then, it is worth noting that some projects have been lined up for funding under the Initiative. These include the funding and construction of the Kunzvi Dam and the Harare–Chirundu highway, the rehabilitation of Harare’s water system, the refurbishment of the Sable Chemicals fertiliser plant, a power transmission arrangement, and an agreement for the export of citrus fruits to China. These projects are expected to increase Chinese participation in Zimbabwe’s economy as well as contribute to the country’s goal of achieving a middle-income economy by 2030, a plan popularly known as ‘Vision 2030’.

Current Economic Relations

Trade: Official trade figures for 2019 show that Zimbabwe’s exports to China were worth 974 million USD while importing 368 million USD’s worth of goods. Zimbabwe mainly exports tobacco, cotton, and various minerals to China, while imports from China include electrical goods, auto parts, and various household goods. China is Zimbabwe’s largest market for flue cured tobacco, with over 200 million USD’s worth of trade in 2017. This largely owes to the out-grower scheme used by Chinese companies, especially Tian Ze Tobacco Company, a subsidiary of the Chinese state monopoly China Tobacco, which is involved in contract farming with small holder farmers. While Zimbabwe may not be an important economic partner to China owing to its ailing economy and small population of 15 million, China presents an important opportunity for Zimbabwe to diversify its economic partnerships in an effort to defeat the sanctions imposed by the West.

Investment: Since the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe at the turn of the century by its erstwhile partners in the West, China has risen to be the country’s largest foreign investor. However, the investment figures still remain low relative to China’s investment in other African countries. According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Chinese foreign direct investment in Zimbabwe between 2003 and 2019 amounted to 12.13 billion USD. At the same time, Zimbabwe media have reported some large investment deals, including 3-billion-USD investment in various sectors in 2018, and a 4.2-billion-USD coal deal for the Sengwa coal mining and power plant projects signed between the Zimbabwe government and Chinese companies in 2020. The first phase of the Sengwa Coal Power Plant is being implemented by the Power Construction Corporation of China at a cost of 1.2 billion USD. The project is being funded by the Industrial and Commercial bank of China. The bigger part of the project will be done by China Gezhouba Group at a cost of 3 billion USD. 

Aid and other state-backed finance: Since Zimbabwe’s proclamation of the LEP in 2003, China has availed significant lines of credit to the Southern African nation in the form of commercial, concessional, as well as grant funding. These lines of credit and grant support extend across much of the Zimbabwean socio-economic landscape. According to the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), a civil society organisation, Chinese government grants and the Export and Import Bank of China (Eximbank) have funded projects in health, water, transport, communication, power, and buildings sectors between 2000 and 2018.

China has also supported Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector. Key government staff are being trained in China. Added to these arrangements, the Chinese funded and set up a 30-million-USD Gwebi Agricultural Technological Demonstration Centre to the west of Harare. The government of Zimbabwe was also awarded with a 200-million-USD buyer’s export credit by China’s Eximbank in 2006 for the purchase of necessary inputs in the country’s agriculture. Overall, Chinese aid and other state-backed finance has created room for some infrastructure projects to be completed in Zimbabwe, in what is a very difficult economic environment.

Key Controversies

The bilateral relationship between China and Zimbabwe has a number of associated controversies. In the political realm, China is accused of aiding an autocratic regime that has survived by rigging elections and meting out violence on political opponents. Owing to its non-interference policy, China does not publicly involve itself in internal matters of independent foreign states, even when the concerned state is blatantly violating human rights. It is in connection with this policy that China has ignored ZANU Patriotic Front ’s use of extreme measures in holding on to power. For instance, in 2005 China did not criticise Zimbabwe’s Operation Murambatsvina (literally, ‘remove trash/clean up’), when the Zimbabwean government forcibly destroyed ‘illegal’ urban properties under the guise of cleaning the urban areas, which was in fact a way for the government to disrupt urban areas seen to be strongholds of the political opposition. As a result, thousands were left homeless and without a source of livelihood. A key controversy relating to Chinese engagement in Zimbabwe came to the fore in 2008, when Robert Mugabe was defeated in the first round of the general election by Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of the opposition. Just prior to the run-off election of 27 June 2008, the government unleashed a violent campaign against opposition supporters to the extent that Tsvangirai withdrew from the presidential race. This prompted the drafting of a sanction resolution against Mugabe’s government, in the UN Security Council, but this was vetoed by Russia and China. This again left China siding with an ‘illegitimate’ regime in Zimbabwe, unconcerned with the plight of Zimbabwean citizens. To make matters worse, in the same year the Chinese sold the Zimbabwean government a variety of weapons. The ship that carried the arms cargo could not dock in Durban owing to protests. Another concern dogging the bilateral relationship is the opacity and secrecy that characterises most dealings. Most major deals that involve government-to-government arrangements have allegedly not been submitted to the Zimbabwean parliament for scrutiny. Rather, they come to the parliament only for rubber stamping after the executive has already signed and completed the deals. This lack of transparency in turn leads to corruption or the suspicion of it.

Added to these concerns is the issue of the abuse of labour rights by Chinese companies doing business in Zimbabwe. There have been accusations of such companies paying low salaries or physically abusing their employees (including beatings and shootings), as well as concerns related to the lack of proper protective wear at industrial sites. In 2020, a Chinese manager at a mine operating in the City of Gweru shot and injured some of his workers owing to a dispute over salaries and working conditions. The Chinese embassy in Zimbabwe was called in to help solve the dispute and the Chinese manager was later arrested and compensation paid to the injured worker.

In-depth Sources

English-language Media:

Local media outlets in English include The Independent and The Financial Gazette.

Books, Scholarly Articles, and Research Reports:

• African Forum and Network on Debt and Development. 2020. ‘The China-Zimbabwe Relations: Impact on Debt and Development in Zimbabwe.’ African Forum and Network on Debt and Development website. Link. 
• Chan, Stephen and Hasu Patel. 2006. ‘Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy: A Conversation.’ The Round Table 95, no. 384: 175–90. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00358530600585693
• Chipaike, Ronald and Paul Henri Bischoff. 2019. ‘Chinese Engagement of Zimbabwe and the Limits of Elite Agency.’ Journal of Asian and African Studies 54, no. 7: 947–64.
• Hodzi, Obert, Leon Hartwell, and Nicola De Jager. 2012. ‘“Unconditional Ai”’: Assessing the Impact of China’s Development Assistance to Zimbabwe.’ South African Journal of International Affairs 19, no. 1: 79–103.
• Mukwereza, Langton. 2013. ‘Reviving Zimbabwe’s Agriculture: The Role of China and Brazil.’ IDS Bulletin 44, no. 4: 116–26. Link.
• Thompson, Reagan. 2012. ‘“Assessing the Chinese Influence in Ghana, Angola, and Zimbabwe: The Impact of Politics, Partners, and Petro.’ Center for International Security and Cooperation website. Link.
• Zhang, Chun. 2014. ‘China–Zimbabwe: A Model for China–Africa Relations?’ SAIIA Occasional Paper, No. 205. Pretoria: Global Powers and Africa Programme. Link.

Cover Photo: Victoria Falls, Zimbawe. Credits: @Plb06 (CC).