Background

Madagascar’s relations with China span the colonial era and four post-independence Malagasy republics. Madagascar established formal diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in November 1972, as the African nation transitioned from the pro-France first republic to the pro-socialist second republic. However, informal and semi-official connections between Madagascar and China date back to the nineteenth century, when Chinese migrants from Guangdong Province settled on the island. Over the following century, the Sino-Malagasy community (ethnically known as sinoa) gradually expanded across the entire island, with more small-scale traders arriving, predominantly from Shunde County in Guangdong. This community has now reached its fourth or even fifth generation, and intermarriage with the local population is common. Some younger sinoa adhere to their Guangdong ancestry and carry Chinese passports, while others have become integrated into mainstream Malagasy society, among them two recent Malagasy ambassadors to China, Victor Sikonina and Jean Louis Robinson. Though no official census exists, a sinoa community leader the author interviewed in 2022 estimated that 10,000 to 20,000 Cantonese-speaking sinoa live in Madagascar today, with up to one million more having partial Chinese lineage according to their cultural practices or names.

In the 1940s, the Republic of China (ROC) set up a consulate-general in the port city of Toamasina (Tamatave), which was a hub for the Chinese community. The last consul defected to the newly formed PRC in 1949—an unusual event in China–Africa relations. The Taiwan-based ROC Government maintained an embassy in Madagascar until 1972—when Madagascar switched its diplomatic recognition—and a representative office until 2000. In this era, the PRC and the ROC vied to win over Malagasy regimes through competing investments and aid commitments. Many Madagascar-born Chinese have pursued education in either mainland China or Taiwan, which further fragmented the political loyalties within the community, although support for Taiwan has notably decreased since 2000. This is reflected in local associational life. Starting from the early twentieth century, the Chinese communities have built congregations (associations and halls) across the major towns in Madagascar. Local Chinese schools, initially built with ROC support, are now increasingly incorporated into the PRC’s Confucius Institutes and Classrooms program. According to the author’s field research, less than 100 Taiwanese now live in Madagascar, most working in the export–import and textile industries. Taiwanese aid has been mainly channelled through the Buddhist organisations Tzu Chi and Amitofo Care Center in the form of humanitarian relief and language education.

After Madagascar’s gradual shift towards Beijing under its pro-socialist regime, immigrants from the PRC began arriving in the early 1980s. This wave of migration was dominated by Fujianese (Hokkienese), whose trade and livelihoods closely mirrored those of their Cantonese and Taiwanese predecessors. In the 1990s, the Behoririka district of Madagascar’s capital, Antananarivo, saw the rise of its famous Chinatown, where Fujianese and Cantonese-owned shopping malls drew large crowds and caused congestion at the city’s bottleneck junction—a daily urban marvel that persists today. New migrants also showed greater interest in Madagascar’s untapped natural resources. Mineral, agricultural, forestry, fishery, and livestock resources became major exports to China. The mainland Chinese and Taiwanese textile industries benefited from Madagascar’s low-cost labour and preferential trade conditions under the US African Growth and Opportunity Act and the European Union’s Everything But Arms scheme. This period was also characterised by a proliferation of illicit activities involving members of the Chinese community and Malagasy elites, particularly the notorious smuggling of rosewood to China. According to the author’s interview with a former rosewood dealer, this trade persisted until the 2010s.

Madagascar has been an important ideological and strategic ally of the PRC. The Malagasy independence movement that resulted in independence from France in 1960 was partly inspired by the success of the Chinese Communist revolution. Gisèle Rabesahala, a leftist human rights activist who later became Madagascar’s first female minister and councilwoman, attended the Asian Women’s Conference in Beijing in December 1949. According to the memoir of Jin Boxiong, the PRC’s first ambassador to Madagascar, Didier Ratsiraka—a young leftist military attaché stationed in Paris in the early 1970s who would later serve as the country’s foreign minister as well as its third and fifth president—initiated contact with PRC counterparts to formalise relations. In the final period of Ratsiraka’s presidencies (1975–93, 1997–2002), in 1999, Madagascar’s then foreign minister Lila Ratsifandrihamanana proposed to her Chinese counterpart, Tang Jiaxuan, an exchange platform between China and African countries, which later became the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)—the primary mechanism for collaboration between China and the continent.

The formalisation of relations and the advent of mainland Chinese migration also brought large-scale aid projects in the 1980s and 1990s. Highlight events included a visit from Chinese president Li Xiannian in November 1986. It was followed by the opening of the Moramanga–Andranonampango road, a partial rehabilitation of the island’s primary artery National Route RN2, which connects Antananarivo to the country’s only deep-sea port, Toamasina. In these initial years of bilateral relations, the PRC’s aid projects largely focused on material support and disaster relief, with the intention to cement its relationship with the still-wavering Malagasy Government and the longstanding Sino-Malagasy community—in competition with the ROC’s remaining influence. Other large aid projects launched in this period include the Mahamasina Sport Palace in Antananarivo and the Morondava Sugar Plant (see the discussion of labour disputes below).

In the 2000s, under Marc Ravalomanana’s third republic, Chinese aid to Madagascar expanded in line with Ravalomanana’s pro-investment and foreign trade policies. Key projects targeted education, agriculture, and roadworks. However, the 2009 coup that led to Andry Rajoelina’s rise and years of international sactions abruptly ended this phase and disrupted ongoing Chinese projects. The political situation stabilised around 2015, and the establishment of the fourth Malagasy Republic eventually enabled most projects to regain momentum, including Chinese-backed infrastructure developments.

BRI Status

Madagascar seeks to balance its foreign policy among major powers. By engaging in Chinese-led international initiatives, it positions itself as China’s potential strategic partner on the Maritime Silk Road. Madagascar was among the first African countries to sign a memorandum of understanding with China to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2017. Seeking to diversify its sources of financing, Madagascar has also joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, currently as one of the nine sub-Saharan African members. In 2024, Madagascar, alongside Cambodia, became a founding partner of the International Mangrove Centre in Shenzhen, joining China’s efforts to promote a Green Belt and Road and global wetland governance.

Current Economic Relations

Trade: According to United Nations Comtrade data, China has been Madagascar’s largest trading partner in the past decade, followed by France, India, Oman, and South Africa. China is by far the largest source of imports for Madagascar. Chinese exports to Madagascar amounted to 1.39 billion USD in 2023, largely comprising electronic equipment, machinery, fabric, vehicles, plastics, steel, furniture, and cotton. Madagascar’s exports to China totalled 267.5 million USD in 2023, including predominantly ores such as graphite, micas, stones, and nickel, and aquatic resources such as crustaceans. Madagascar is seeking to expand its exports of agricultural goods to China. The inaugural shipment of mutton, sent in 2024, took advantage of China’s latest policy of zero tariffs on African products and the intermediary role of the island’s Chinese business community. It is important to note that the total trade volume between China and Madagascar in 2023, including both exports and imports, was lower than in previous years, due to the escalating economic crisis in Madagascar.

Investment: Madagascar’s local market and resources have attracted considerable Chinese investment. From 2017 to 2019, Chinese investors registered more new companies in Madagascar than those from France, India, and Mauritius, according to the Economic Development Board of Madagascar. Most Chinese investment has been focusing on agriculture (including fisheries), manufacturing, and construction. However, as latecomers, Chinese investors have been less successful in obtaining control over important resources, compared with other major international ventures such as the Ambatovy nickel–cobalt mine controlled by the Japanese Sumimoto Corporation and Korea Resources Corporation, the QMM ilmenite–zircon–rutile mine with investment from Brazil’s Rio Tinto, the Toliara Mineral Sands Project developed by the Australian mining company Base Resources, the Malagasy Oil S.A. controlled by a Singaporean–Indonesian national, and the Korean Daewoo Palm Oil Project.

Among the prominent Chinese investors in Madagascar are Yuan Longping High-Tech Agriculture, which promotes the cultivation of hybrid rice using Chinese agricultural aid and is diversifying its business into other agricultural products. SOMAQUA, a subsidiary of China’s national fisheries corporation, also operates in Madagascar. Tianli Agri is a major player in Madagascar’s cotton industry with equity investment from the China–Africa Development Fund, a Chinese state-backed fund supporting investment in Africa. King Deer Cashmere, which set up its first Madagascar factory in 1997, has been the island’s largest Chinese investor so far, benefiting from Madagascar’s low labour costs and preferential trade status, as well as loans from the China Development Bank.

Aid and Other Development Finance: In the context of re-emerging China–Africa cooperation, China’s aid to Madagascar started to increase in the early 2000s under the presidency of Marc Ravalomanana (in office 2002–09)—a period recognised for its pro-investment and foreign trade policies. Many impactful aid projects were initiated during this period, including the Confucius Institute at the University of Antananarivo, four China–Madagascar Friendship Schools, an agricultural-technology demonstration centre for hybrid rice, the rehabilitated Ampitabe–Vatomandry Road (known in Chinese sources as the Ang–Wa Road 昂瓦公路), a training program for Malagasy athletes in China, and the Ivato International Conference Center.

The 2009 coup affected some of the ongoing Chinese projects. The construction of the China–Madagascar Friendship School in Ambohidratrimo was delayed and resumed only after 2015. The Ivato International Conference Centre and associated Golden Peacock Hotel, both designed to accommodate the 2009 African Union Summit, were suspended due to the coup. Plans to commercialise the hotel were never fully realised, according to the author’s interview with a former hotel employee.

Major Chinese projects resumed in 2015, following the establishment of the fourth Malagasy Republic and subsequent political stabilisation. This period featured an increase of Chinese-funded road projects in Madagascar. China funded two Airport Expressway projects linking the Ivato International Airport to Antananarivo, including the Andohatapenaka-Boulevard de l’Europe Bypass completed in 2017—funded by a commercial loan and a preferential buyer’s credit from the Export–Import Bank of China (Eximbank)—and the Tsarasaotra–Ivato Road Rehabilitation Project completed in 2021, also funded by a concessional loan from the Eximbank. In 2017, China granted funds to rehabilitate the ‘Egg Road’ northwest of Antananarivo to help poultry farmers transport eggs safely (officially known as the Capital Suburban Road Project). In 2018, China offered a concessional loan for the development and expansion of RN2 between Toamasina and Tsarakofafa. This project includes the construction of the Tamatave–RN2 Expressway connecting RN2, Pangalane Bridge, and the Port of Toamasina, which is often referenced in Chinese sources as an exemplar of development cooperation following the 2018 FOCAC Summit. It is often referenced in external sources—including reports by the US Council of Foreign Relations, the Organisation for Research on China and Asia in India, and Africa Intelligence—as China’s attempt to take control of the port. Yet, these speculations are unfounded. In 2019, China provided Madagascar with a concessional loan to rehabilitate RN5A (Ambilobe–Vohémar Road), the only direct route linking Madagascar’s east and west coasts and a key passage for transporting its famous spices such as vanilla.

Since Andry Rajoelina—who first seized power in 2009 after toppling the third republic and led a transitional government until 2014—returned to the presidency in 2019, Madagascar has been turning towards European, World Bank, and Arab financing to rehabilitate its rapidly deteriorating road network, which has become a top national priority. This shift partly stems from mounting concerns about debt sustainability and a desire to diversify borrowing. Yet, despite relying less on direct Chinese funding, Madagascar’s infrastructure sector remains dominated by Chinese construction firms that originally entered through Chinese aid-financed projects. Major contractors such as the China Railway Construction Corporation, the China Communications Construction Company, the China Geo-Engineering Corporation, China Road & Bridge Corporation, and Sinohydro have retained a solid foothold and continue to bid on road-repair tenders. These companies may continue to benefit from their experience and established local presence to secure contracts, despite reduced financing from China’s state banks. They remain influential players in Madagascar, even if infrastructure financing increasingly comes from non-Chinese lenders.

In addition to road deterioration, Madagascar under Rajoelina’s rule faces increasing nationwide shortages of power, water, and food. According to the Global Hunger Index, the island country ranks at the bottom (124 of 127 countries) on the global malnutrition map—a situation exacerbated by climate change–induced drought and more frequent cyclones. External assistance, including that from China, has become ever more crucial to address these pressing issues. In 2019, the China–Food and Agriculture Organization–Madagascar South–South Cooperation Agricultural Project—a collaboration with the Mahitsy Chinese hybrid rice demonstration centre—was launched to support Madagascar’s agriculture, livestock, and fisheries. In 2024, construction began on the Ranomafana Hydroelectric Power Station, which is funded by a concessional loan from China’s Eximbank. It is reported to be the largest Chinese-funded project in Madagascar, with Sinohydro as the contractor. The same company also upgraded the European Investment Bank–funded Andekaleka Hydroelectric Power Station, which is Antananarivo’s main power supplier. During the 2024 FOCAC Summit, Rajoelina secured a Chinese grant for the ‘Medium Ring Tana’ project, which aimed to modernise the Antananarivo Interconnected Network for the first time in 60 years. The project is contracted to the Chinese group Tebian Electric Apparatus and funded by a grant from the Chinese International Development Cooperation Agency. China, alongside other international donors, provided emergency humanitarian aid through the UN World Food Programme to supply rice to climate-affected vulnerable communities in southern Madagascar.

Since 1975, China’s Gansu Province has dispatched medical teams to Madagascar. The teams are currently stationed at the Anosiala University Hospital Center, which was built with a Chinese Government grant. Subteams operate at Vatomandry, Ambovombe, and Sambava regional hospitals. The China–Madagascar Traditional Chinese Medicine Center was opened in 2019, by then vice-premier Sun Chunlan. Lately, new Chinese aid initiatives in Madagascar have emerged alongside the evolving bilateral economic priorities. For instance, the University of Antananarivo co-hosted a Luban workshop with two Tianjin vocational colleges for training in electrical and automotive engineering.

More recently, China has deepened science cooperation with Madagascar. In 2024–25, joint laboratories were launched between Chinese research institutes and Malagasy universities to study coastal ecosystems, biodiversity, and infectious diseases. A new species of Araceae from northern Madagascar was discovered by the Sino-Africa Joint Research Center at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (SAJOREC) and named for it (Carlephyton sajoreciae 中非中心灰岩芋).

Key Controversies

Madagascar’s unique ecology, wealth of natural resources, and fragile governance structures have made it a magnet for investors enticed by grand yet ill-conceived visions. Chinese investors, in particular, have drawn heightened scrutiny. Local discourses sometimes single them out as exploitative or driven solely by profit. China’s image often overshadows that of other foreign players involved in similarly problematic ventures. Below are some of the major controversies that have shaped perceptions of Chinese business activities in Madagascar.

Rosewood Smuggling

One of the most notorious cases involves large-scale smuggling of endangered rosewood—a lucrative trade that thrived in the 2000s and allegedly implicated government officials as well as Chinese business partners. This not only worsened deforestation in Madagascar’s biodiverse forests but also gave rise to a narrative of predatory Chinese engagement. Although global pressure eventually curbed the trade, rosewood smuggling reinforced the public perception that Chinese investors tend to disregard local laws and ecological responsibility.

Land and Sea-Grabbing

After the 2009 coup, the Wuhan Iron and Steel Corporation reportedly paid 100 million USD to Madagascar’s transitional government for iron ore exploration rights in the Soalala region, raising concerns about deals struck during political turbulence. Critics blamed Chinese companies for assisting the junta to circumvent international sanctions, exploiting the country’s vulnerable political situation to secure valuable concessions. Separately, in 2016, a Chinese-owned goldmining operation secured official permits but was met with resistance from local villagers in Soamahamanina. Protesters accused the company of disregarding environmental impacts and failing to share economic benefits with host communities. Eventually, the government revoked the company’s licence.

In 2018, Madagascar’s president Hery Rajaonarimampianina (in office 2014–18) invited Chinese investors to develop a new seaport in Narinda. More controversially, a Malagasy company controlled by the president’s son announced a plan to bring in an investor from Fujian with hundreds of fishing vessels—a move that, if realised, would allow them to dominate the country’s fishing sector. Amid domestic opposition, most investment agreements, including the seaport project, were terminated after the initial survey, as Rajaonarimampianina soon stepped down from office.

Labour Disputes

In December 2014, disputes over low pay and mistreatment of workers at the Morondava Sugar Plant, a Chinese aid project from the mid-1980s that had been run by the Chinese state-owned enterprise COMPLANT, became violent. The clash resulted in the deaths of at least four Malagasies, the withdrawal of Chinese staff, a 30-million-USD loss, and the plant’s full shutdown. Despite intervention from two successive Malagasy governments, plans to reopen the plant with other partners have not materialised.

Construction Quality

During his first term, Andry Rajoelina (in office 2019–25) allocated 4 per cent of the national annual budget to building the Mahamasina national stadium, seeking to make this project his political legacy. Construction was contracted to the China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC). After the stadium’s completion in 2021, the Confederation of African Football’s assessment found it technically unsafe and disqualified it from hosting games for Madagascar’s national football team. This development sparked online debate in Madagascar, with some blaming the Chinese contractor for the shortcomings, while others pointed to potential oversights by the Malagasy Government and local architects. Consequently, locals often refer to the stadium as a failed Chinese project, as it was constructed and maintained by CSCEC.

Collectively, these cases have reinforced the widespread perception in Madagascar that Chinese investors operate with little oversight or in collusion with the regime. More broadly, China’s engagement in the region is often viewed through the lens of Beijing’s strategic ambitions, associating investment projects with potential military or geopolitical objectives. When such projects falter, the resulting reputational damage tends to be magnified. However, it is also important to note that many of the controversial projects—whether in resources, ports, or fisheries—were driven as much by Malagasy elites’ pursuit of foreign capital as by Chinese initiative, often resulting in rushed and poorly negotiated deals. Some high-profile controversies were misattributed to China, such as the Korean Daewoo Logistics’ lease of 1.3 million hectares for palm oil and corn production, and the Ampasindava rare-earth mining project led by a Singaporean-Mauritian consortium. Both drew fierce public opposition amid confusion and suspicion about Chinese investment. The tendency to blame China thus often eclipses the complicity of local elites and other international players—a recurring pattern across the broader China–Africa context.

On the other hand, Chinese business communities, including small-scale sinoa businesses such as grocery stores and pizza and ice-cream makers scattered across the island, have been targeted by looters during political crises. In 2009, rioters looted several Chinese shopping malls in Behoririka, Antananarivo’s Chinatown. During the three-week Gen Z revolution that toppled Rajoelina’s rule in September and October 2025, the looting of a newly opened large trade centre owned by Zhejiang businessmen was even livestreamed on social media.

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