Background

The historical connection between China and Mauritius can be traced to the period preceding Mauritius’s independence. Since the nineteenth century, migrants from southern China have been arriving in Mauritius—initially as labourers on sugar plantations, and later as free merchants. The Sino-Mauritian community—Mauritians of Chinese descent, predominantly Hakka—has played an important role in the Mauritian economy as merchants. They also maintained close transnational ties with relatives in Guangdong, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and various Southeast Asian countries.

As early as 1949, pro–People’s Republic of China (PRC) Chinese groups in Port Louis’ Chinatown raised the flag of the newly founded state, but the Sino-Mauritian community remained politically divided. When Mauritius declared independence on 12 March 1968, a ‘Peking faction’ advocated strongly for establishing official ties with Beijing, while a significant number of Sino-Mauritians and at least one Sino-Mauritian government minister aligned with Taipei.

Following years of debate, Mauritius ultimately decided to recognise the PRC. Formal diplomatic relations were established on 15 April 1972, during prime minister Seewoosagur Ramgoolam’s visit to Beijing, when he met with Chinese premier Zhou Enlai. During this visit, the two sides discussed five technical assistance projects, as Mauritius sought alternative financial support beyond the World Bank and the Soviet Union. As documented by Thomas Burnham, this led to the signing of the Sino-Mauritian Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation, under which Beijing provided an interest-free loan of 13.5 million GPB. The funds were designated for joint projects including a new airport, several hospitals, and social housing—representing at the time the largest aid package Mauritius had received from a single country.

After the Mauritius Militant Movement (MMM) took power from the Labour Party (PTr) in the 1976 elections, the Sino-Mauritian relationship remained stable and cooperative. Subsequent Mauritian governments, including that of the Militant Socialist Movement (MSM) led by Anerood Jugnauth, continued to maintain strong bilateral ties with Beijing. With economic reforms and liberalisation in both China and Mauritius, the framework of their cooperation shifted from the early language of ‘Zhou’s Eight Principles’ and ‘internationalism’ to ‘mutual benefits’. Bilateral engagement thus expanded significantly in scale and diversity, as reflected in the growing amount of trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and Chinese migrant workers and enterprises in Mauritius.

This intensifying engagement also fostered closer intergovernmental relations. Beginning in 1984, the Chinese Government offered scholarships to Mauritian students, enhancing educational exchanges. The establishment of the Mauritius–China Committee of Economic Cooperation (MCCI) in 1985 marked a milestone, leading to broader collaboration on infrastructure, agriculture, health, and education. A series of bilateral agreements was signed after the MCCI’s establishment, including the Mauritius–China Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement in 1994, the Mauritius–China Bilateral Investment Treaty in 1996, and the Bilateral Labour Cooperation Agreement in 2005.

Since the 2000s, China–Mauritius relations have deepened—demonstrated through a significant increase in government-to-government projects and Chinese FDI. Between 2004 and 2007, at least eight bilateral agreements were signed, under which China agreed to provide loans to Mauritius for the construction of projects ranging from government buildings to infrastructure. In 2007, the two countries reached an agreement to jointly develop a special economic zone (SEZ) in Terre Riche. Although the construction of the project has been slower than expected, it has been reimagined as a smart city under the Smart Mauritius Scheme, with several key buildings completed or under way.

Beyond development cooperation projects, ties between China and Mauritius have extended across multiple industries. Chinese state-owned and private enterprises have expanded into Mauritius in sectors such as construction, textiles, telecommunications, financial services, renewable energy, and real estate. In this context, many Sino-Mauritians have found new economic opportunities by facilitating the entry of Chinese companies into the local market, providing expertise on local regulations and business practices.

BRI Status

Although Mauritius has maintained close relations with China, it is one of only two African countries that have not formally joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The other country is Eswatini, which, in contrast to Mauritius, maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

This decision reflects Mauritius’s strategic concerns over diplomatic balance and stability within the geopolitical context of the Indian Ocean region. Mauritius has deep economic, political, and diasporic ties with India. Approximately 70 per cent of Mauritius’s population is of Indian origin, and the two countries maintain strong cooperation on defence and security issues. Mauritius has also received substantial development assistance from India over the years. Given India’s proactive opposition to the BRI in various international forums, Mauritius has faced significant pressure to avoid formal participation in the BRI framework. Officially joining the BRI could be interpreted as aligning with China, potentially affecting Mauritius’s relationship with India and altering the geopolitical balance in the region. Despite not joining the BRI, the establishment of the China–Mauritius Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2019 allows Mauritius to be incorporated into China’s broader BRI vision, at least in the realms of trade and investment.

Domestic politics also shaped Mauritius’s cautious position on the BRI. As a democracy, public opinion plays an important role in shaping foreign policy decisions in Mauritius. In local media, concerns have been raised about China’s international engagements, with China often framed as a ‘port-hungry predator’ and its BRI as a potential ‘debt trap’. Such scepticism has further diminished the likelihood of Mauritius formally joining the BRI.

Current Economic Relations

Trade: In 2019, China and Mauritius signed an FTA—the first between China and an African country—which officially came into force in January 2021. The agreement enables both countries to benefit from preferential trade terms and greater access to each other’s markets, covering goods, services, and investment. In 2024, China and Mauritius signed a bilateral currency swap agreement worth 2 billion RMB (approximately 13 billion MUR). This arrangement aims to strengthen bilateral financial ties, promoting the use of national currencies, and advancing trade and investment relations between the two countries.

China has become Mauritius’s largest source of imports. According to the UN Comtrade Database, in 2024, imports from China reached 1.17 billion USD, which represented 18 per cent of Mauritius’s total imports, exceeding imports from India—the second-largest source—by more than 50 per cent. In contrast, Mauritius’s exports to China are relatively low. Mauritius exported goods worth approximately 17.8 million USD to China in 2024—less than its exports to Europe, South Africa, and Madagascar. China mainly exports manufactured goods to Mauritius, including electronics, machinery, and steel products. Mauritius’s exports to China primarily comprise seafood, sugar, and telecommunication equipment.

Investment: In 2023, FDI in Mauritius reached a historical peak of 37 billion MUR, with Europe and South Africa traditionally the main sources of FDI. Four sectors—agro-industry, hospitality, real estate, and information and communication technology—together accounted for 84 per cent of total FDI. By contrast, FDI from China in 2023 amounted to 247 million MUR—significantly less than contributions from these traditional investors. The total stock of Chinese FDI in Mauritius reached approximately 1.52 billion USD by the end of 2022. Chinese investment in Mauritius has been concentrated in key sectors such as finance, real estate, manufacturing, and tourism.

The China–Mauritius FTA is expected to attract further Chinese investment. It offers stronger regulation and protection for Chinese investors, building on and upgrading the bilateral investment protection agreement originally signed between China and Mauritius in 1996. The revised framework introduces substantial improvements in terms of the scope of protection, the level of safeguards, and dispute-resolution mechanisms. It also facilitates the establishment of regional headquarters for Chinese companies in Mauritius, positioning the island nation as a strategic gateway to the African continent. Mauritius’s status as an international financial hub further enhances its attractiveness for Chinese enterprises seeking to expand in Africa.

Aid: Since the establishment of their diplomatic relations, China has provided Mauritius with development assistance including grants and concessional and interest-free loans, supporting major infrastructure projects such as the Jinfei Smart City (an SEZ), a new terminal at the Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam International Airport, the Côte d’Or Multi-Sports Complex, the Bagatelle Dam Project, the Mauritius Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) headquarters, and social housing projects.

In addition to financing key projects, China has donated equipment and material assistance. A notable example is the donation of 30 buses to the National Transport Corporation in 2017. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the Chinese Government, provincial authorities, and various enterprises provided Mauritius with medical supplies, including vaccines, test kits, masks, and personal protective equipment. China has also provided scholarships for Mauritian students to pursue higher education in China, as well as various professional training programs covering language, agriculture, governance, and technical skills.

It is important to note that other countries have also been significant providers of development assistance to Mauritius. India is the largest source of foreign aid to Mauritius, with its assistance focused on infrastructure development, security and defence, education, public welfare, and maritime affairs. Notably, Mauritius’s Metro Express was constructed with the support of Indian official development assistance, reflecting India’s broader efforts to enhance its influence in the island. France, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait have also provided concessional loans to Mauritius to support infrastructure, education, health care, environmental protection, and broader economic development.

Key Controversies

A key controversy surrounding China’s engagement in Mauritius is its impact on local democracy. From the outset, China and Mauritius adopted divergent approaches to cooperation. Chinese bilateral agreements with African countries, including Mauritius, have traditionally been flexible, vague, and opaque, often lacking clear mechanisms for the implementation of aid packages. In contrast, the Mauritian Government has expressed discomfort with this opacity, which has made it difficult to secure parliamentary support and navigate a divided political landscape. Notably, domestic divisions—between the left and the right, and between pro-Beijing factions and supporters of Taipei—have made the issue particularly contentious within both government and society. For instance, Mauritian scholar and activist Roukaya Kasenally has expressed concerns over confidentiality clauses and the lack of transparency in government-to-government agreements with China, many of which are neither publicly debated in parliament nor disclosed to the media. This opacity has fuelled public anxiety about potential corruption and raised broader concerns about Mauritian democracy.

At the same time, China is widely perceived to be advancing a soft-power agenda by promoting major Chinese projects in leading local newspapers. In response, media coverage of China in Mauritius has often raised questions about balance, editorial independence, and space for critical reporting. The Chinese-backed Safe City project—an urban surveillance system purportedly aimed at reducing crime—has intensified public concerns about China’s influence on Mauritian politics and digital security. Critics argue that the surveillance infrastructure introduced through the project significantly expands the government’s capacity to monitor citizens. There is growing fear that Chinese projects such as the Safe City could serve as vehicles for exporting elements of China’s authoritarian governance model to Mauritius. Even when framed as crime-prevention tools, such surveillance technologies are widely viewed as having the potential to erode privacy and undermine democratic freedom. Furthermore, the absence of clear policies on data collection, usage, and storage has deepened anxieties about digital security in Mauritius.

Another concern related to China’s engagement in Mauritius is the financial burden associated with large-scale Chinese-sponsored projects, particularly the Jinfei Smart City. For example, one researcher has criticised such developments for incurring substantial costs without generating proportionate economic or social benefits. To support the development of this SEZ, the Mauritian Government invested heavily in land acquisition, link roads, and off-site utility infrastructure. However, construction of the Jinfei project has progressed far more slowly than expected. The delays have raised questions about the motivations behind China’s involvement, with one researcher describing the project as a potential ‘land grab in new garb’, suggesting that the initiative may serve geopolitical rather than developmental goals.

Key Sources

Scholarly Publications

Ancharaz, Vinaye. 2009. ‘David v. Goliath: Mauritius Facing Up to China.’ The European Journal of Development Research 21: 622–43.

Burnham, Thomas. 2022. ‘Supping with a Long Spoon in the Indian Ocean: The Negotiation of the 1972 Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation between Mauritius and the People’s Republic of China.’ Cold War History 22(3): 245–63.

Cowaloosur, Honita. 2014. ‘Land Grab in New Garb: Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa.’ African Identities 12(1): 94–109.

Guan, Zhijie, Yue Zhang, and Ip Ping Sheong Jim Kwee Fat. 2021. ‘Trade Relations Between Mauritius and China: A Gravity Model Approach.’ SAGE Open 11(4). doi.org/10.1177/21582440211058184.

Kasenally, Roukaya. 2022. ‘China in Mauritius: The Telling of the Chinese Story.’ Asia Policy 29(3):70–78.

Shi, Xuefei. 2024. ‘Maritime China, Sea Temples, and Contested Heritage in the Indian Ocean.’ International Journal of Heritage Studies 30(6): 653–72.

Cover Photo: Tamarin, Mauritius. Source: Arne Müseler (CC).