Background

Nigeria’s relationship with China began to flourish following the normalisation of diplomatic ties in 1971. Between 1970 and 1993, the two countries developed closer political relations, driven by aligned ideological objectives and a shared experience of international isolation. In the 1970s, China supported anti-imperialist movements across Africa, with Nigeria directingM. Kwanashie, ‘Sino-Nigerian Relations: Implications for Trade’, paper presented at the Roundtable on Sino-Nigerian Relation: Economic and Political Dimensions, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos, 26 August 2007.this assistance to national liberation groups.

In the 1990s, both countries faced international criticism—Nigeria for its authoritarian regimes, and China in the aftermath of the 1989 crackdown on the democratic movement—which further strengthened their partnership. Engagement deepened under Nigeria’s ‘Look East’ policy, adopted during the military rule of Sani Abacha (1993–98), which was a period marked by heavy international sanctions. In 1997, premier Li Peng of China’s State Council paid a high-level visit to Nigeria, which at the time was regarded as an international pariah following the execution of activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. The visit included the signing of several bilateral agreements, signalling a strategic pivot by the Abacha regime towards China as a key ally.

Presidents from both countries have since maintained high-level contact, with diplomatic cooperation expanding further after Nigeria’s return to constitutional democracy in 1999.

Since 1999, Nigeria has deepened its ties with China, forging a relationship that has expanded across successive administrations. During the presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007), Nigeria pursued an ‘oil-for-infrastructure’ policy and encouraged Chinese engagement in the energy and telecommunications sectors. This approach continued under presidents Umaru Musa Yar’Adua (2007–10) and Goodluck Jonathan (2010–15), who approved Chinese-backed projects in key infrastructure such as airports and railways, while also expanding development cooperation and bilateral trade.

Under president Muhammadu Buhari (2015–23), Nigeria joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in 2018, and secured major projects, including the Abuja–Kaduna and Lagos–Ibadan railway lines. The administration of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu (2023–present) is continuing this trajectory by aligning national development priorities with the BRI and seeking to deepen cooperation through the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) to attract greater Chinese investment.

In 2024, the two nations elevated their bilateral relationship from a ‘strategic partnership’, established in 2005, to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’, reflecting the shift from specific strategic interests to broader foreign policy alignment. A defining feature of this relationship has been consistent reciprocal support in international forums and platforms. For instance, China has backed Nigeria’s aspiration for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council.

Nigeria recognises Taiwan as part of China, in line with its support for the ‘One China’ policy. China has provided military assistance to Nigeria and participated in joint military drills, signalling the expansion of their cooperation into the security domain. In 2021, more than one-third of Nigeria’s arms imports came from China, reflecting a growing reliance on Chinese weaponry. This is partly due to Nigeria’s difficulties in complying with the requirements of the US Leahy Law, which prohibits the US Government from supplying weapons to foreign military units accused of human rights violations. As a result, China has emerged as a key alternative arms supplier for Nigeria and several other African countries.

The broader partnership between Nigeria and China also emphasises collaborative global diplomacy, with shared commitments Ehizuelen M. M. Omoruyi, ‘A Discourse on Sino-Nigeria Engagement and Possible Benefits Driving Nigeria Increasing Engagement with China’, in Five Decades of Unified Sino-Nigeria Engagement Cooperation, Zhejiang University Press and Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Hangzhou and Lagos, 2023, pp. 3– 50. to major initiatives such as the African Union’s Agenda 2063, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, FOCAC, the BRI, UN reform, and joint climate action.

Amid ongoing geopolitical competition between China and the United States, Nigeria has exercised considerable agency in selecting its diplomatic and economic partners. During former US secretary of state Antony Blinken’s African tour in 2021, Nigerian foreign minister Geoffrey Onyeama underscored the country’s pragmatic approach to managing its relationships with both powers, stressing Nigeria’s prioritisation of securing the most advantageous agreements, regardless of origin.

As an oil-exporting nation, Nigeria has historically enjoyed greater fiscal autonomy than many other African countries. When diplomatic relations with China were first established in the 1970s, Nigeria declinedEditorial Team of Biography of Fang Yi, 方毅传 [Biography of Fang Yi], p. 477. Beijing’s customary offer of interest-free loans, which were typically extended to African nations that recognised the Chinese Government. Instead, Nigeria chose to self-finance the technical assistance provided by China. This unique arrangement later helped catalyseEditorial Team of Biography of Fang Yi, 方毅传 [Biography of Fang Yi], p. 477 the development of China’s international contracting industry. By the late 1990s, Nigeria had become one of China’s leading markets in Africa.

BRI Status

In September 2018, on the sidelines of the FOCAC summit in Beijing, President Buhari pledged to cooperate with China under the BRI. This commitment was reaffirmed in October 2023, when Vice-President Kashim Shettima attended the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in China. There, he reiterated Nigeria’s dedication to strengthening BRI ties and secured 2 billion USD in science and engineering projects, along with 4 billion USD in investment commitments between Nigerian and Chinese partners.

At the World Economic Forum held in China in June 2024, Nigerian Foreign Minister Yusuf Maitama Tuggar dismissed the ‘debt trap’ narrative, arguing that it undermines Nigeria’s capacity to make informed decisions, and stressed that exaggerated risk perceptions should not deter essential investment. In September 2024, on the sidelines of the subsequent FOCAC summit in Beijing, President Bola Tinubu signed a memorandum of understanding to deepen cooperation under the BRI. In a joint statement, both parties affirmed their intention to align the BRI with Nigeria’s development priorities to foster stronger collaboration across key sectors.

Current Economic Relations

China has invested significantly in Nigerian industry and infrastructure, including the successful launch of Nigeria’s first satellite into orbit in 2011. Its ‘oil-for-infrastructure’ model—trading investment in infrastructure for access to oil—has facilitated cooperation across manufacturing, infrastructure development, and energy exploration.

Trade: Bilateral trade between Nigeria and China has grown significantly, rising from about 300 million USD in the 1990s to more than 22.6 billion USD in 2023. By 2023, Nigeria was China’s third-largest trading partner in Africa, following South Africa and Angola. In 2023, trade between the two countries accounted for roughly 8 per cent of China’s total trade with Africa. Despite this growth, the relationship is marked by significant trade imbalances. According to data from the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database, Chinese exports to Nigeria reached 18.99 billion USD in 2023, while Nigerian exports to China totalled only 1.61 billion USD.

Nigeria’s exports to China, traditionally dominated by raw commodities, are also changing. China’s oil imports from Nigeria are declining as it increasingly sources crude from Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Russia, and other Asian producers with more stable output. Between 2019 and 2023, the value of China’s crude oil imports from Russia and major Asian suppliers rose by more than 40 per cent, while imports from Nigeria fell by 61 per cent over the same period.

Infrastructure: Chinese companies have played a prominent role in Nigeria’s infrastructure development, particularly in the railway and airport sectors. According to the Chinese Ambassador to Nigeria, by 2021 China had mobilised more than 20 billion USD for major infrastructure projects in the country, especially in transportation and energy.

A flagship project is the 1,343-kilometre Lagos–Kano Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), contracted to China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC), which is intended to replace the colonial-era narrow-gauge network. The Abuja–Kaduna segment opened in July 2016 and, in May 2018, Nigeria’s transport minister secured a 6.68-billion-USD contract with CCECC for further phases, including the Ibadan–Osogbo–Ilorin (200 kilometres), Osogbo–Ado Ekiti–Ilorin–Minna (270 kilometres), and Minna–Abuja–Kaduna–Kano (305 kilometres) sections. In June 2021, the Lagos–Ibadan segment—West Africa’s first modern double-track SGR—commenced full operations.

Another major Chinese-backed project is the Lekki Deep-Sea Port, Nigeria’s first deep-sea port and one of the largest in West Africa. Operational since April 2023, the port involved more than 1 billion USD in investment, with China Harbour Engineering Company holding a 52.5 per cent majority stake. With a 14-metre draft and an annual capacity of 2.5 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs), the port is central to Nigeria’s ambition to become a regional maritime hub.

Additional key projects include the Lagos Rail Mass Transit Blue Line, West Africa’s first electrified and cross-sea light rail system, which began operations in January 2021; and the Abuja rail mass transit project, launched commercially in May 2024. The 387-kilometre Kano–Maradi railway, linking northern Nigeria with Niger, is under construction by China Communications Construction Company and other contractors. Notably, at the Third Belt and Road Forum in October 2023, China committed to refinancing and completing the Abuja–Kano and Port Harcourt–Maiduguri railways—projects previously stalled due to funding gaps. This renewed commitment stands out amid a broader post–Covid-19 decline in Chinese lending to Africa.

Investment: In 2005, in response to Nigeria’s plan to generate 40 billion barrels of oil reserves by 2010—requiring an estimated 10 billion USD annually—PetroChina signed an 800-million-USD deal to import 30,000 barrels of Nigerian oil per day, renewable annually for five years. Building on this momentum, in 2006, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) acquired a 45 per cent equity stake in the Akpo oilfield’s oil prospecting licence (OPL) 246. According to the agreement, CNOOC would receive 70 per cent of the profits, while the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) would retain the remaining 30 per cent. Licences for four additional oil blocks—OPL 471, 721, 732, and 298—were granted to China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in return for a pledged 2.27-billion-USD investment in the modernisation of the Kaduna refinery. In 2010, CNOOC secured approval for a 30 to 50-billion-USD investment in 23 offshore oilfields. China has also shown growing interest in Nigeria’s liquefied natural gas industry, with PetroChina and other firms acquiring stakes in this increasingly important sector.

By 2020, Nigeria ranked among the top five African recipients of Chinese investment, alongside Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, and Ethiopia. Chinese capital in Nigeria has expanded well beyond petroleum, encompassing both mineral extraction and downstream processing. In October 2023, for instance, China’s Ganfeng Lithium Industry Limited inaugurated a 250-million-USD lithium processing facility—a key step in developing local refining capacity in a sector critical to the green energy transition. For Nigeria, whose economy remains heavily reliant on oil and mineral production, these investments represent a significant opportunity for value-added industrialisation.

China’s role in Nigeria’s digital economy has also grown. Huawei is a dominant force in the country’s 5G infrastructure, and Chinese-backed fintech companies are making inroads in the push for financial inclusion. PalmPay, supported by Transsion and other Chinese firms, and OPay, valued at 2 billion USD, offer a broad range of financial services and have rapidly expanded their user bases in recent years.

Chinese investment has likewise supported the development of multiple industrial and special economic zones. These include projects such as Ofada Vee Tee Rice Limited, an agriculture-allied industrial venture that supports local rice farmers and rural livelihoods, and the Kajola Specialised Railway Industrial Free Trade Zone, which is designed to attract foreign investment in rail infrastructure. More than 1,000 Chinese businesses are based in Lagos’s China Town.

One of the most prominent initiatives is the Ogun Guangdong Free Trade Zone, a joint venture between the Ogun State Government (18 per cent) and a Chinese consortium (82 per cent) comprising Guangdong Xinguang International Group, China–Africa Investment Limited, and CCNC Group. The zone is focused on small-scale manufacturing. Similarly, the Lekki Free-Trade Zone (LFTZ)—established in 2007 through a partnership between China–Africa Lekki Investment Company Limited (60 per cent), the Lagos State Government (20 per cent), and its subsidiary Lekki Worldwide Investment Limited (20 per cent)—targets industries such as telecommunications, textiles, and pharmaceuticals. The LFTZ offers generous incentives, including tax holidays, full foreign ownership, and duty-free importation of raw materials. More than 60 companies are now fully operational in the zone, spanning sectors from textiles to agricultural processing. As one of the largest trade zones in West Africa, the LFTZ highlights China’s strategic role in Nigeria’s industrial development through joint ventures, infrastructure, and long-term commercial partnerships.

Lending: As Chinese lending rose across Africa in the twenty-first century, China became Nigeria’s largest bilateral creditor. However, Nigeria’s borrowing from China remains relatively modest in proportion to the size of its economy. What distinguishes Chinese loans is not just their bilateral nature but also their size—often larger than those from multilateral lenders. Between 2000 and 2022, China extended 23 loans to Nigeria worth approximately 8 billion USD, primarily targeting the information and communication technology (ICT), electricity, and transportation sectors—three core infrastructure areas in which Chinese companies are heavily involved. The Export–Import Bank of China (China Eximbank) served as the principal financier, issuing 18 loans totalling 7.6 billion USD, which accounted for about 78 per cent of Nigeria’s total borrowing from China during this period.

According to the Nigerian Debt Management Office, as of the end of 2023, Nigeria’s outstanding debt to China was 5.167 billion USD, representing 12.16 per cent of the country’s total external debt stock. Despite the relatively stable flow of funds, Chinese financing has occasionally faltered. In 2020, China Eximbank withdrew from its earlier commitment to fund the 22.8-billion-USD Kaduna–Kano railway project, citing concerns over Nigeria’s repayment capacity in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. This forced Abuja to seek interim financing from Standard Chartered, until Nigeria’s Senate approved the China Development Bank (CDB) as a replacement funder in April 2023. In January 2025, the CDB released the first tranche of 255 million USD to the railway project.

Other finance: In 2018, the Central Bank of Nigeria entered into a bilateral currency swap agreement worth 2.4 billion USD with the People’s Bank of China. Renewed in April 2021, the agreement expired in April 2024, and it remains unclear whether it has since been extended. Implementation of the swap has faced several challenges, including Nigeria’s persistent trade imbalance with China, limited domestic demand for the renminbi, and the relatively small size of the swap—accounting for just 2 per cent of the 124 billion USD in bilateral trade between 2018 and 2023. In light of ongoing depreciation of the Nigerian naira, some Nigerian legislators have recently called for the revival of the currency swap and the formal recognition of the Chinese yuan as a reserve currency to facilitate bilateral trade and reduce pressure on Nigeria’s foreign exchange reserves.

Key Controversies

Debt: The narrative of a Chinese ‘debt trap’ has entered Nigeria’s national discourse. In May 2020, the Nigerian House of Representatives launched an inquiry into Chinese loans, citing ‘global concerns about the alleged fraudulent, irregular, and underhand features of Chinese loan contracts with some African countries’. In response, Nigeria’s Debt Management Office issued a statement on 18 June 2020, titled ‘Facts About Chinese Loans to Nigeria’, which was prominently displayed on the agency’s homepage. The statement clarified that Chinese loans accounted for just 3.94 per cent of Nigeria’s total public debt and that repayments were incorporated into the national budget to reduce the risk of default.

Although the parliamentary probe appeared to have been shelved by 2021, public concern persisted—particularly around the inclusion of a ‘sovereign immunity waiver’ clause in Chinese loan agreements. Critics argued that such clauses could compromise Nigeria’s sovereignty. However, legal experts have since explained that these waivers are standard features in international project finance, designed to ensure that governments cannot unilaterally avoid dispute resolution mechanisms.

Despite these clarifications, controversy has continued, fuelled by a 2021 arbitration case in which a Chinese company successfully targeted Nigerian assets abroad. Following a 70-million-USD judgement, the company seized Nigerian guesthouses in the United Kingdom and three presidential jets in France. This episode has further stoked suspicions that some Chinese loans may be structured with a high risk of failure, potentially leading to asset seizures and reinforcing debt-trap anxieties.

Treatment of Nigerian citizens in China: Racism against Nigerians in China has remained a persistent issue, fuelling heightened tensions during the Covid-19 pandemic. On 10 April 2020, footage went viral of Nigerian diplomat Razaq Lawal publicly denouncing the mistreatment of Nigerians in Guangzhou. Highlighting the disparity between this discrimination and Nigeria’s fair treatment of Chinese nationals during the pandemic, Lawal alleged that Nigerians’ passports had been confiscated and they were subjected to quarantine periods longer than those imposed on Chinese citizens. The incident provoked widespread anti-Chinese sentiment in Nigeria, prompting the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Femi Gbajabiamila, to summon then Chinese ambassador Zhou Pingjian to provide an explanation.

Reflecting the complex and at times strained nature of people-to-people relations between the two countries, the Nigerian Medical Association also expressed disapproval of the government’s decision to invite a Chinese medical team to assist in responding to the pandemic.

Labour practices: Significant concerns have been raised about unethical labour practices among some Chinese enterprises operating in Nigeria, including allegations of worker exploitation, aggression by Chinese managers, and conditions described by workers as resembling slavery. These issues have long attracted criticism from the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), which argued at a 2013 trilateral meeting that China prioritises its own industrialisation over Africa’s development, focusing on raw material extraction rather than supporting regional industrial growth. Trade unions such as the National Union of Civil Engineering, Construction, Furniture and Wood Workers have accused Chinese businesses of violating Nigerian labour laws and international standards. In 2014, they issued a 14-day ultimatum calling for government intervention to address these violations.

In 2023, the NLC organised protests and picketing actions to raise concerns about casualisation, breaches of safety standards, and abuses of Nigeria’s expatriate quota system. Although reports of Chinese convict labour being used in Nigeria have been debunked, unease remains over the employment of Chinese labourers in low-skilled jobs, which many argue restricts opportunities for Nigerian workers—especially given China’s strict enforcement against undocumented foreign labourers within its own borders.

Competition with imported Chinese goods: Nigeria’s industries continue to face structural challenges—including limited access to power, capital, and technology—that hinder their ability to compete with Chinese imports. While there have been collaborative ventures, such as United Nigerian Textiles Limited’s partnership with Chinese firms, the influx of Chinese products, particularly in the textile sector, has had a detrimental impact on domestic enterprises. This tension has fuelled public discontent, exemplified by protests against Chinese imports in Kano in 2015. Four years earlier, then governor of the Central Bank Sanusi Lamido Sanusi warned against excessive reliance on Chinese goods and urged greater investment in domestic production and consumption.

Despite these concerns, Chinese goods—including contaminated, substandard, and counterfeit products such as fake pharmaceuticals—remain widely available in Nigeria. Their prevalence is partly sustained by smuggling networks and partnerships with local traders. While the Chinese Government maintains that its exports are competitively priced rather than inferior in quality, a widespread perception persists in Nigeria that Chinese products are unreliable and of lower quality.

Key Sources

Books, Reports, and Scholarly Articles

Blair, Alex. 2023. ‘The FDI Landscape in Nigeria in 2023.’ Investment Monitor, 26 June. Link.

Bräutigam, Deborah, and Xiaoyang Tang. 2011. ‘African Shenzhen: China’s Special Economic Zones in Africa.’ The Journal of Modern African Studies 49(1): 27–54.

Chen, Irene Yuan Sun, Rex U. Ukaejiofo, Tang Xaioyang, and Deborah Brautigam. 2016. Learning from China? Manufacturing, Investment, and Technology Transfer in Nigeria. SAIS China Africa Research Initiative Working Paper 2, January. Washington, DC: School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. Link.

Ibonye, Vincent. 2017. ‘China–Africa Cooperation: Struggling Commodities and the Silver Lining in the Innovation Economy.’ International Area Studies Review 20(2): 160–78.

Ibonye, Vincent. 2023. ‘The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Nigeria–China Economic Cooperation.’ In Five Decades of Unified Sino-Nigeria Engagement Cooperation, edited by Ehizuelen M.M. Omoruyi, 66–81. Hangzhou, China, and Lagos: Zhejiang University Press and Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.

Moses, Oyintarelado, Jyhjong Hwang, Lucas Engel, and Victoria Yvonne Bien-Aime. 2023. A New State of Lending: Chinese Loans to Africa. GCI Policy Brief 019, 09/2023. Boston, MA: GDP Center, Boston University. Link.

Tom-Jack, Pamela I. 2016. The Evolving Geopolitical Relations of Nigeria and China: What is the Impact of the Nigeria–China Trade and Direct Investment on the Nigerian Economy? Public and International Affairs Research Papers, 27 April. Ottawa: University of Ottawa. Link.

Usman, Zainab, and Xiaoyang Tang. 2024. ‘How Is China’s Economic Transition Affecting Its Relations with Africa?’ 30 May. New Delhi: Carnegie India. Link.

Cover Image: Lagos, Nigeria. Source: Sentinel Hub (CC).